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 ABSTRACT 
 
Risk management plays a role in avoiding and escaping chronic poverty throughout the world, 
particularly for women, who are disproportionately negatively affected by shocks. Using three years of 
household survey data, administrative records and qualitative interviews, this paper examines the 
relationship between gender and demand for index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) among pastoralists in 
southern Ethiopia. Though IBLI appears to be equitably accessed by men and women alike, demand is 
gender-differentiated along three dimensions: risk aversion, informal insurance and product education 
channels. We also find modest differences associated with age and share of income from livestock.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Multiple studies demonstrate how, in the developing world, women and their children are 
disproportionately negatively affected by household-level shocks (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Hoddinott, 
2006; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2000; Dercon and Hoddinott, 2005; Behrman, 1988; Rose, 1999). In a 
majority of these studies, low-income households exhibit larger intra-household inequalities relative to 
higher income households, suggesting that poor women and their children experience shocks more 
profoundly than their wealthier counterparts do. As a result, women are overrepresented among the 
world’s poor and vulnerable and therefore may benefit disproportionately from improved risk 
management (Banthia et al., 2009). The social norms and institutions that render women’s physical, social 
and economic vulnerabilities different than those of men may, at the same time, impact their access to 
innovative products intended to mitigate the long-term detrimental effects of shocks, such as index 
insurance. Index-based livestock insurance (IBLI), designed to protect against catastrophic livestock loss 
due to drought, is one such product, and the question of whether and how access to IBLI coverage varies 
by gender remains unexplored. Understanding what determines access to IBLI by gender can shape 
strategies to equitably provide access to this and other innovative risk management products. 
 Unlike standard insurance, index insurance contracts are not designed around policyholders’ 
actual losses, but around an exogenous index that is supposed to be highly correlated with policyholders’ 
losses. In the case of IBLI, the index was originally designed for implementation in northern Kenya using 
longitudinal data on herd mortality statistically fit to remote-sensing data known as Normalized 
Differenced Vegetation Index (NDVI), that depicts the vegetative conditions (that is, greenness and 
brownness) in these difficult-to-reach areas (Chantarat et al., 2013).i When the cumulative deviation of 
NDVI from mean levels predicts livestock mortality rates beyond a given threshold, insurance payouts are 
triggered. Compensation varies linearly with the size of the predicted loss. IBLI was subsequently adapted 
to southern Ethiopia’s Borana Zone, the focus of this paper.  
Index-based products are particularly useful in developing country settings where insured 
amounts tend to be small relative to the transactions costs associated with executing a contract in a limited 
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infrastructure environment. Information asymmetries that plague insurance products (that is, moral 
hazard, adverse selection) may be more likely to exist in remote parts of the developing world due to poor 
infrastructure and monitoring capacity.  
 Despite its potential to overcome difficulties associated with more standard insurance products, 
demand for IBLI and similar products has been weaker than expected (Jensen, et al., 2014). One key 
difference between standard insurance products and index-based products that may explain poor demand 
is basis risk. Basis risk is the mismatch between a policyholder’s actual losses and the losses predicted by 
the index, which can result in the policyholder being compensated for losses he or she did not experience 
or experiencing losses without receiving compensation. The relationship between basis risk and demand 
for index insurance has been investigated in multiple contexts and suggests that basis risk has an inverse 
relationship with insurance demand, but the magnitude of the effect remains largely unknown  (Mobarak 
and Rosenzweig, 2013; Jensen, et al., 2014). 
 Basis risk aside, theory and prior empirical work suggest that other primary determinants of 
demand for index-based products include price, trust, credit constraints, understanding of the product and 
the consumer’s attitude toward risk (Hill et al., 2011; Giné et al., 2008). A willingness to pay field 
experiment and ex ante simulation of IBLI performance suggests that the availability of coping strategies, 
a household’s expectation of loss and herd size are key determinants of demand for IBLI specifically 
(Chantarat, 2009).  
 To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that focus specifically on gender and demand 
for index insurance products. In northern Kenya in 2010, 62 per cent of IBLI purchases were made by 
women, while female-headed households made up 37 per cent of the sample, yet Jensen et al. (2014) find 
no significant gender effect on demand. In Ethiopia, roughly 20 per cent of purchasers are women, which 
corresponds to the proportion of households that are female-headed. Virtually all purchases in Ethiopia 
were made by household heads. Takahashi et al. (2014) find that being female is associated with a greater 
likelihood of IBLI purchase, but a lower total insured herd value. Given these ambiguous findings, and 
the pastoralist environments in question where men have higher financial literacy, greater control over 
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assets, more education and access to information, one might expect differential access to innovative risk 
management products between men and women.  
 This study exploits the overlap between purchasers and household heads in Ethiopia to 
understand determinants of IBLI demand that may vary by gender using household-level panel data 
informed by a series of qualitative interviews. Building on previous empirical findings, we posit that risk 
aversion, informal insurance, product education and female-held assets are particularly relevant to 
women’s demand for IBLI. Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, we find no 
gender difference in overall demand for IBLI, but that there are subtle differences in drivers of demand by 
gender. We find gender-differentiated average marginal effects of informal insurance access and home-
centered marketing on the IBLI purchase decision and level of purchase, respectively. Older age of 
female household heads is associated with slightly lower demand by women, while women’s smaller 
shares of livestock income is associated with higher demand. Finally, we find evidence of gender 
influencing IBLI purchase through means not captured in the model, which may be due to vulnerability to 
pressure by sales agents. 
 The remainder of the paper begins with a review and discussion of key elements of insurance 
demand and gender, followed by descriptions of the study setting, and data. We then discuss qualitative 
findings related to model specification before moving on to the estimation strategy and interpretation of 
results. After a final discussion of synthesized results, we conclude with implications for policy and 
further research. 
 
 
KEY ELEMENTS OF INSURANCE DEMAND AND GENDER 
Risk aversion 
 A consumer’s attitude toward risk should be a key determinant of his or her willingness to pay 
(WTP) for insurance. However, in the case of index insurance, the presence of basis risk may confound 
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the theoretically positive relationship. If the factors that drive IBLI’s basis risk have a gender dimension, 
then we could expect to see gender-differentiated responses to equal levels of risk aversion.  
 Much empirical and experimental work has attempted to determine whether there is a relationship 
between gender and risk aversion and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms of the relationship are. In a 
review of the topic, Eckel and Grossman (2008) note that many studies on gender and risk aversion lack 
rigor and fail to control for difficult-to-measure traits like confidence, or even measurable ones such as 
income or wealth. Furthermore, measures of risk aversion and its associated characteristics, such as 
perceptions of risk, are likely highly sensitive to context and risk domains (Weber et al., 2002). The vast 
majority of studies on gender and risk aversion have taken place in experimental settings at American or 
European universities, often with relatively low stakes. Given the sensitivity of risk aversion measures, 
caution should be exercised in applying findings from one context to another.  
 One study of risk aversion in the Ethiopian highlands found no difference in risk preferences 
between men and women (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009), though these results may not be generalizable to 
pastoralist Ethiopia given the substantial difference between the two settings. In the context of index 
insurance, Giné et al. (2008) find no relationship between demand and gender, but they suggest an 
interaction effect between risk aversion and knowledge in that risk averse individuals with little 
knowledge of the product are less likely to purchase than those with greater knowledge. In cases where 
women’s knowledge of the product is systematically lower, this could translate to a gender effect 
associated with risk aversion. Similarly, a gender difference in perceived risk of, say, drought, could 
translate to a gender effect on demand operating through risk aversion. Given the lack of consistent, 
generalizable findings on gender and risk aversion, the relationship between gender, risk aversion and 
demand for livestock insurance remains an empirical question. Any differences in the impact of risk 
aversion on IBLI uptake by gender may be attributable to inadequate controls for product understanding, 
differences in trust of the product or of the insurance company. We can expect the effect of risk aversion 
on IBLI uptake to vary by gender, but the direction of the effect remains ambiguous.  
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Informal insurance  
 Informal risk management institutions exist in virtually every society and include kin networks 
based on reciprocity, indigenous lending organizations and similar arrangements designed to mitigate the 
impact of shocks, either ex ante or ex post. The effect of informal insurance on demand for formal 
insurance products remains an empirical question. Studies on the coverage of informal risk management 
institutions, both aggregate and differentiated by income, have repeatedly shown that informal insurance 
falls short of fully protecting households against covariate shocks and performs only slightly better in 
protecting against idiosyncratic shocks (see Morduch, 1999; Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010 for reviews), 
but whether informal insurance is a substitute for or a complement to index insurance is unclear. Where 
index insurance protects households against covariate shocks, it may serve as a complement to informal 
mechanisms that protect against idiosyncratic shocks and a substitute for informal mechanisms, such as 
remittances, that protect against covariate shocks. 
 To what extent do informal mechanisms among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia cover 
idiosyncratic risk?  Lybbert et al. (2004) suggest that idiosyncratic risk dominates among these 
pastoralists and that livestock transfers offer only limited insurance coverage. In the same context, Santos 
and Barrett (2011) find that that informal loans of cattle function as a safety net rather than as insurance in 
that loans are given contingent on the borrower’s expected gains rather than the borrower having 
experienced a shock. These two cases suggest that informal mechanisms weakly, if at all, insure 
pastoralists against idiosyncratic or covariate risk.  
 Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) consider participation in informal networks in the context of 
index insurance where basis risk is present. They find that participation in networks that cover 
idiosyncratic risk, as opposed to the covariate risk targeted by index insurance, interacts with basis risk to 
affect demand for the index insurance product. Where basis risk driven by idiosyncratic risk is high, 
index-based products complement informal insurance participation, but where basis risk is low informal 
risk sharing has no effect on demand. If idiosyncratic risk is poorly covered by informal mechanisms 
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IBLI is unlikely to complement informal insurance. If that is the case, then informal insurance should 
have a negative or no effect on demand for IBLI. 
 While none of the above findings pertain specifically to gender, women’s risk might be less 
covered by informal institutions than that of men, due to differences in wealth or social connectedness. 
Even if IBLI were to cover covariate shocks perfectly over a given index area, women’s experience may 
be more or less like the average of the index area. If gender is correlated with something that makes 
women different from the average, such as social connectedness, this could drive levels of idiosyncratic 
losses.  
 Additionally, access to informal groups and networks is not exogenously determined and thus the 
most vulnerable might be excluded from some informal insurance arrangements due to their inability to 
keep up with reciprocity arrangements or pay entry costs (Santos and Barrett, 2011; Cohen and Sebstad, 
2005; Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010). A gender effect operating through variation in wealth or social 
networks may emerge in econometric analysis if adequate measures of these attributes are not included. It 
is also important to remember that heterogeneity within female-headed households likely plays a role, as 
the marital status of a female household head is likely correlated with her wealth and the nature of her 
social networks. If female-headed households and male-headed households are engaged in different types 
of informal insurance or experience different levels of coverage, they may exhibit a different demand 
pattern for an index-based product. 
 
IBLI product education 
 The challenges of marketing a sophisticated insurance product to remote communities with high 
illiteracy and limited prior exposure to formal insurance cannot be understated, and consumer 
understanding of how the product works is essential to making the decision to purchase. Thus, marketing 
of index-based insurance products necessarily involves an education component. When information 
channels are male-dominated and women are difficult to reach, gender sensitivity in marketing and 
education matters for uptake by women (Banthia et al., 2009).  
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 Anecdotal evidence suggests that women do not have access to the information they want about 
IBLI, but it is not clear whether this is a gender-specific phenomenon. Women’s community involvement 
and market participation is clearly on the rise in Borana (Hertkorn ,2013; McPeak et al., 2011), suggesting 
that the extent to which women are able to access information channels may also be in flux. The 
successful education of women about IBLI hinges upon effective strategies for accessing women. We 
would expect that education through female-accessible channels would have a stronger positive 
association with IBLI uptake by women relative to men.  
 
 Female assets and bargaining power 
 Asset holdings have implications for avoiding chronic poverty and, worldwide, women tend to 
command fewer assets than men (Deere and Doss, 2006). Pastoralist regions in Ethiopia are consistent 
with this. In this setting, livestock is the primary asset, but intra-household ownership arrangements are 
complex. Previous work investigating gender and livestock ownership focuses almost exclusively on 
household-level livestock ownership in relation to the gender of the household head rather than intra-
household ownership arrangements. McPeak et al. (2011) suggest that male-headed households in 
southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya are more likely to own all types of livestock, while female-headed 
households are more likely than male-headed households to own no livestock at all, but the intra-
household details of these ownership arrangements are not clear.  
 Although in pastoralist Ethiopia, ownership is not clearly articulated, it can be argued that women 
hold special rights over animals that are lactating, because milk production and caring for young animals 
falls squarely into the female domain in these societies (Coppock, 1994; McPeak et al., 2011). Lactating 
animals thus generate a large portion of the female income stream and lactation rates themselves are 
sensitive to drought. Given these factors, one would expect women to have greater incentive to insure 
when there are many lactating animals in the household herd. At the same time, a woman’s control over 
lactating animals and associated income might increase her capacity to self-insure and lower her WTP for 
IBLI. Therefore, the relationship between such assets and IBLI uptake remains ambiguous. 
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 Asset ownership can also increase a woman’s intra-household bargaining power, which is 
important in cases where the unitary model of household decision-making fails and household members 
do not share identical preferences (see Chiappori and Donni, 2009 and Alderman et al., 1995 for 
discussions of the unitary model). McPeak and Doss (2006) demonstrate contested decision-making 
processes in milk marketing decisions in northern Kenya, supporting the conclusion that preferences are 
likely different among household members. In the context of non-identical preferences, one of the factors 
that shapes an individual’s bargaining position within a household is her defection point, or what she can 
expect to walk away with if bargaining fails and the household dissolves. The control a woman exerts 
over household assets such as livestock influences her defection point. Women’s incentive to insure could 
be positively correlated with the size of her endowment, which would in turn be positively correlated with 
bargaining power, suggesting potential for a positive relationship between female assets and female IBLI 
purchase. Bargaining factors lead us to expect that female assets have a stronger positive effect on IBLI 
uptake by women than by men, but considering the ambiguity of the relationship between wealth and 
IBLI uptake mentioned above, the overall effect is ambiguous.  
 In light of the four elements of gender and microinsurance demand discussed above, the 
remainder of this analysis considers demand for IBLI for an individual i at time t, (𝑌𝑖𝑡) as 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑖 ,  𝑅𝑖, 𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) +  𝜀𝑖𝑡       
where 𝐺𝑖 represents gender, 𝑅𝑖 represents an individual’s time-invariant risk aversion, 𝐼𝑖𝑡 represents 
informal insurance coverage,  𝐾𝑖𝑡 represents product education and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents female assets. 
Additionally, 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represent, respectively, price, current IBLI coverage and a host of 
demographic and insurance-related controls. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents a disturbance term. Before specifying 
the model in depth, we turn to discussion of the setting, data and key variables. 
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SETTING AND DATA 
 The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Cornell University, and the Oromia 
Insurance Company (OIC), in collaboration with local government agents, and numerous researchers, 
introduced the IBLI product in the southernmost part of the Oromia Regional State of Ethiopia in August 
2012, following the successful piloting of a similar product in neighboring northern Kenya in January 
2010. IBLI is marketed and sold by OIC, with technical support provided by ILRI. IBLI policies are sold 
twice a year in August/September and January/February, which correspond to the ends of the dry seasons 
of the region’s bimodal rainfall pattern. Contracts cover a one-year period and individuals choose the 
number of animals they insure. IBLI is priced by geographic region and species, according to drought 
risk. Insurance premiums range from 7.5-11 per cent of the estimated value of the animal. 
This analysis takes advantage of three sources of data. The introduction of the IBLI product 
involved collection of annual household survey data and several experimental features, all of which were 
designed to aid in impact assessment and encourage IBLI uptake. We validate key aspects of the survey 
data using OIC administrative sales records. Informed by initial exploration of two rounds of survey data, 
We implemented a complementary qualitative data collection tool in April 2014 with the express purpose 
of addressing gaps in the survey data and enhancing understanding of key concepts relating to IBLI 
uptake and gender.  
 
Survey and Administrative Data 
 The survey sample was selected prior to IBLI implementation to capture geographic, agro-
ecological and livelihood variation in the eight southernmost woredas of the Oromia Regional State where 
IBLI would be offered. The household survey sample was clustered by reera, a subunit of the woreda, 
containing approximately 100-300 households. Reeras inaccessible by vehicle were excluded for 
logistical and cost reasons.ii  For the selected reeras, local government development agents (DAs) were 
deployed to compile household rosters containing the name of the household head and livestock 
holdings.iii Stratifying by livestock terciles, a proportional random sample of 15 per cent of each reera was 
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drawn with a minimum rule of 25 households per reera. Where 15 per cent of households in one reera did 
not meet the 25 household minimum, neighboring reeras were combined into a single sampling unit, 
making a total of 17 sampling units (ILRI, 2014). 
 The household survey is conducted annually in March, following the conclusion of the 
January/February IBLI sales period. Baseline data were collected in 2012 with repeated data collection in 
2013 and 2014. Though data are collected annually, many variables are collected using a monthly or 
seasonal recall structure. This allows for analysis using two periods within each year that correspond to 
the twice-yearly IBLI sales period and bimodal rainfall pattern, as depicted in Figure 1.iv Data are 
collected on a broad range of household characteristics and behaviors relating to livelihoods, livestock 
management, herd dynamics, wellbeing, risk management and demographic characteristics. Baseline data 
consist of 515 households. After attrition and missing data, 456 households are retained for analysis.v  
 In order to encourage uptake of IBLI and aid in understanding the effects of liquidity constraints 
on insurance purchase, discount coupons were randomly distributed to 80 per cent of households across 
all reeras in the sample. Only 55 per cent of households reported having received the discount coupon, 
suggesting some implementation or recall error, therefore we use assignment data, rather than household 
self-reported data. Discounts ranged from 10-80 per cent for purchase of up to 15 tropical livestock units 
(TLU) of livestock.vi The remaining 20 per cent of households received no coupon.vii Because recall of 
coupon receipt and discount amounts was imperfect, we use assignment data, cross-validated against OIC 
records where possible, rather than that reported by survey respondents. 
 The 2014 survey data collection involved two features designed to contribute to this study. First, 
marital status for all female-headed households was verified and, where the household head was a married 
female, additional information about the status of the husband was gathered. This served to validate 
previously collected marital status data. Second, ILRI collected information on the endowment of 
livestock brought to the household by brides at marriage, as well as information on current stocks and 
recent flows of such animals.  
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Qualitative Data 
 Following Patton (2002) the qualitative sample is stratified along the key dimensions of IBLI 
purchase history and gender of household head. To better understand heterogeneity within female-headed 
households, we stratify within this category by marital status. This created eight unique categories from 
which we intended to sample two households at specific points along the distribution of wealth, measured 
by the household’s herd size during the 2014 survey period (see Appendix C for complete description of 
qualitative methodology). Based on this sample, qualitative interview data were collected from 15 survey 
households in April 2014.viii The interview guide was designed after preliminary analysis of the first two 
rounds of survey data in order to complement survey data in order to test the four conceptual hypotheses 
outlined above. 
 In particular, the qualitative data provided an opportunity to examine the perceptions of risk 
associated with IBLI in order to better understand the role of risk aversion. Interviews also explored the 
nature and extent of informal insurance coverage in Borana and perceptions of differences in coverage 
between men, women and people of different marital statuses. Lastly, interviews elicited consumer 
preferences surrounding sources of information about IBLI and the stated reasons for these preferences. 
Qualitative data also provided an opportunity to enhance description and contextual understanding, and 
bring new information about heterogeneity to categories and behaviors that appear homogeneous in the 
survey data. Ultimately, the qualitative data validated survey data to improve the identification and 
understanding of measurement error in key variables, thus informing variable construction, econometric 
model specification and interpretation of econometric results. The most salient qualitative findings are 
reported in the following discussion of variable construction and, later, in the interpretation and 
discussion of econometric findings.  
 
KEY VARIABLES  
IBLI purchase and TLU insured 
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 The ILRI survey contains a question asking if the respondent purchased insuraansii horrii, or 
livestock insurance, in the past year and the qualitative sample was selected based on reported purchase 
behavior. However, we found significant error in these variables when implementing qualitative 
interviews, which led us to validate survey responses using OIC administrative data. When compared 
against administrative data, only 87% of respondents correctly identified their recent purchase behavior. 
Of all misreported purchases, 80 per cent were false positives while only 20 per cent were false negatives, 
indicative of systematic over-reporting of IBLI purchase. The majority of false positives were households 
that had purchased IBLI at least once in previous years, but appeared to misunderstand the reference 
period of the survey question. Other false positives were households that may have failed to make the 
distinction between purchasing the IBLI product and being part of the survey sample. A majority of 
households (73%) in our qualitative sample conflated the ILRI survey or visits by OIC and ILRI staff 
with the IBLI product at least once in the interview when asked about insuraansii horrii, suggesting that 
people understand the term in a variety of ways. False negatives are likely due to the interviewee in the 
survey being different from the person who purchased and poor information sharing within the household, 
a pattern that could also contribute to false positives. Given the non-random nature of the measurement 
error in reported IBLI purchase, and its centrality to this analysis, for the main analysis we use OIC 
administrative IBLI purchase data as the dependent variable, instead of reported IBLI purchase. 
 
Gender of IBLI purchaser 
 The gender of the household head is the most practical proxy for gender of purchaser, given that 
it is highly correlated with the gender of the person named on the insurance contract (bivariate correlation 
coefficient of 0.94). Furthermore, in the limited cases where the head was not the purchaser, one might 
assume that the household head influences the purchase decision in some way and, indeed, this dominates 
in the qualitative data on decision making. Being the household head was cited as the reason the 
respondent had the most influence over a livestock or budget allocation decision in 67% of households. In 
this analysis, a female-headed household with a male individual named on the insurance contract is 
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considered a female IBLI purchase and vice versa. Neither of these cases is a common occurrence in the 
survey data where women in male-headed households made only 2.2 per cent of total IBLI purchases and 
1.3 per cent of purchases were made by men in female-headed households.  
 
Risk aversion  
 The baseline household survey included a risk preference experiment in which the respondent 
chooses from a set of six gambles where risk and expected outcome are positively correlated (ILRI, 
2014). Using these data, we create a set of binary variables by combining the two lowest, middle and 
highest levels of risk aversion to represent low, moderate and high risk aversion.  
 
Informal insurance coverage 
 Finding a meaningful indicator of informal insurance coverage is a challenge. Prior studies’ use 
of informal cash and in-kind transfers between households and network group participation as measures 
of informal insurance coverage (Lybbert, 2004; Jensen et al., 2014), motivated qualitative data collection 
tailored to explore the extent to which these institutions—groups and transfers—serve an informal 
insurance function in the Borana context. It appears that network groups and transfers capture 
participation in institutions that may function as informal insurance, but not all groups and not all 
transfers are insurance. 
 The network groups captured in the survey—mostly savings and loan groups and small business 
groups—provide extremely limited idiosyncratic insurance coverage and may not be meaningful as a 
measure of informal insurance. While all but one group allowed members to take out loans when facing a 
shock, the three respondents who had taken advantage of this option described the group contribution to 
the wellbeing of their household as ‘small’ or ‘low’ compared to other sources of assistance in difficult 
times. Two respondents stated explicitly that the group had not helped them to date and the remaining six 
respondents were unwilling to say the group had no benefits but at the same time were unable to articulate 
benefits they experienced.ix 
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 Qualitative data suggest that the decision to give a transfer is driven by two factors. The first, 
which was demonstrated in the data from 100 per cent of qualitative respondents, is the normative belief 
that one is obligated to help those who are most in need, regardless of transfer history. The second 
consideration is the giver’s recollection or expectation of reciprocity by the receiver, which was stated 
directly by 60 per cent of qualitative respondents. Qualitative validation of 58 specific transfers recorded 
in the survey data suggested that nearly half of transfers may be insurance-related in that they provide one 
of several overlapping types of coverage described by McPeak (2006) in the form of ex ante investment 
in future incoming transfers from recipients (50%), ex ante preparation for the receiver in anticipation of a 
planned expense such as a birth or marriage (34%) and/or ex post coping for the receiver after an 
idiosyncratic shock (42%). In light of qualitative findings, informal insurance is represented using the 
total of the absolute values of monthly cash and in-kind transfers received and given by the household in 
order to capture not only the insurance a household experiences in the form of a transfer receipt, but also 
the insurance a household experiences when they engage in ex ante insurance behaviors by giving to 
others with the expectation of reciprocity. 
 
Product education 
 The survey captures the IBLI education experience of the household based on 14 specific 
questions about sources of information through which the household learned about IBLI. Qualitative 
interviews probed the ways that people learned about IBLI and which information channels worked and 
didn’t work for them individually. Again, the issue of whether people consider the difference between the 
IBLI product and participation in the IBLI survey sample comes into play. When asked about learning 
about insuraansi horrii, nearly half (46%) of respondents focused initially on ‘learning’ that the IBLI 
team was coming to do the survey (that is, being informed to stay home and wait for the enumerator) or 
similar administrative information rather than increasing their understanding of how the IBLI product 
functions. During the interviews, we took care to clarify the focus of our interest, but it is unlikely that 
enumerators did so during survey data collection. While all respondents—male and female—indicated 
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that they prefer to be taught about IBLI in their homes for such reasons as convenience, reducing 
distractions and increased opportunity to ask questions, one might expect that this is more important for 
women whose domestic responsibilities, such as caring for children, cooking and looking after lactating 
and newborn animals, limit their mobility. Additionally, only two women indicated that they attended 
community meetings where IBLI was discussed, and both opted to listen and let others ask questions.  
 One approach to measuring the product education experience of the household using existing data 
is the number of separate sources of information about IBLI that the household received. The survey data 
do not capture the intensity of information or the type of information received through these sources, so 
this fails to disentangle IBLI product-focused information itself from information about the 
implementation of the survey or the presence of OIC sales agents in the community. Another approach is 
to incorporate survey data on the ‘most important source’ of IBLI information, however qualitative data 
completely contradicted patterns in the survey data.x Another approach is to use only information sources 
that are explicitly product-focused such as radio, posters and OIC extension agents, but this fails to 
account for the unanimous sense among women that learning is more difficult in away-from-home 
settings. A woman may learn less from a product-focused information session at a community meeting 
and more from an incidental conversation about IBLI with a health worker performing a home visit. 
Coincidentally, home-centered and product focused information channels are nearly mutually exclusive 
(Table 1). The intersection of these two categories consists of radio broadcasts — only 10 per cent of the 
sample owns a radio — and the cartoon/tape intervention assigned to one third of households in the first 
sales period only. Thus, in the variable construction decision there is a tradeoff between different types of 
measurement error associated with product-focused channels versus home-centered channels. Home-
centered channels may be biased upward from information ‘learned’ related to implementation that is 
reported as IBLI product information, while product-focused channels may present information focused 
on the IBLI product directly, but without capturing the level of learning that took place. Given the 
importance of home-centered information to women, we opt to structure the variable as the proportion of 
total information sources that are home-centered.  
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Female assets 
 A good proxy for intra-household bargaining power will be correlated with a woman’s bargaining 
power, but not endogenous to her decision to purchase IBLI. Commonly used proxies for bargaining 
power include women’s inherited assets, women’s current assets, women’s income shares, unearned 
income and assets, and human capital brought to marriage (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Hoddinott 
and Haddad, 1995; Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990). We propose two different context-appropriate 
measures of female-controlled assets as proxies for bargaining power. 
 In the process of marriage in Boran culture, the bride and groom bring livestock gifted from their 
family members to the newly-formed household herd. Cattle from the bride’s father are known as horrii 
siiqqee (HS). Focus group discussions suggest that while everyone considers all animals to belong to the 
household, HS cattle and their descendants are identifiable by all as part of the wife’s endowment and that 
there may be subtle restrictions on what can be done with these animals (for example, selling, 
slaughtering, gifting) without the wife’s consent. Importantly, the wife retains these cattle in the rare, but 
possible, event of a divorce. At the same time assets gifted by family members at marriage may be 
correlated with the degree to which a woman’s family invested in her physical and social wellbeing 
throughout her childhood. As such, a married woman’s decision to purchase IBLI may be influenced by 
her bargaining power, but also directly influenced by the unobserved ways her parents invested in her as a 
child. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) suggest that virtually all proxies for bargaining are vulnerable to 
endogeneity, but that a strength of using assets brought to marriage is that, unlike current asset holdings, 
it is unaffected by endogenous decision-making processes within the marriage. HS animals are expressed 
as a percentage of original herd at marriage. An alternate measure of bargaining power using current 
assets controlled by the woman can be proxied by the number of lactating animals in the household herd. 
Milking and milk products represent the female contribution to the economy of the household (Coppock, 
1994; Hertkorn, 2013). Lactating animals are expressed as a percentage of total herd. 
 
17  
 
RESULTS 
Summary Statistics 
 As summarized in Table 2, panel households are 21 per cent female-headed, a majority of whom 
are widows. Married female household heads comprise 20 per cent of the female-headed households and 
tend to be polygamous households where multiple wives maintain separate households, or cases where 
men were away herding at the time of the survey. In terms of female headship, the sample is consistent 
with other estimates of the prevalence of female headship in Ethiopia which range from 9 per cent of 
married households countrywide (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002) to 29 per cent of households in 
southern Ethiopia specifically (McPeak et al., 2011). Ethnically, households were overwhelmingly Boran 
and practiced traditional forms of religion. More than three quarters of households are fully settled and 
few households remain nomadic.  
 Table 3 shows the overall means for the full sample as well as means for male and female-headed 
households and differences. Detailed information on the construction of all variables is located in 
Appendix A. Households in the sample have, on average, 19 TLU of livestock. Total income is, on 
average, equivalent to $190 USD per household per month, only about $18 of which are cash earnings. 
Given the average household size of 7.3 individuals, this implies an average income of roughly $0.86 per 
day, 90 per cent of which is in-kind, highlighting widespread poverty and the subsistence economy in the 
region. Male-headed households (MHHs) have per-person income of $0.89 per day while female-headed 
households have a per-person income of $0.68. Other statistically significant differences between male 
and female-headed households suggest potential for gender-differentiated IBLI demand. Female-headed 
households (FHHs) have, on average, smaller herds, lower total income, and lower participation in 
transfers and network groups. FHHs’ reliance on livestock income is 14 percentage points lower than 
men. Between male- and female-headed households there is no difference in highest educational 
attainment of any household member, but female households heads have significantly lower personal 
educational attainment than male household heads and also scored lower on a financial literacy test 
conducted at baseline. There are no differences in risk aversion or expectations of upcoming rangeland 
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conditions. Female household heads are, on average, older than male household heads, probably due to 
the number of widows and longer female life expectancy. FHHs are smaller by almost two people, yet 
there is no apparent difference in dependency ratios. Members of FHHs also participate in fewer network 
groups. These two features are likely due to MHHs consistently containing at least two adults while most 
FHHs contain only one. With respect to IBLI, FHHs have fewer sources of IBLI information, yet this is 
not reflected in a lower score on a series of questions designed to test an individual’s knowledge of IBLI. 
The rate of IBLI purchase does not differ by gender of household head. FHHs that insure animals, insure 
fewer animals, though the percentage of herd insured is not significantly different between household 
types.  
 These means tests demonstrate multiple pathways in which demand could shift for women. To 
the extent that income and wealth impact demand, one might expect lower demand for IBLI in female-
headed households due to smaller herd sizes and lower incomes, or, conversely, if income increases the 
capacity to self-insure, one might see higher demand among lower-income groups such as women. 
Gender differences in the proportion of income from livestock could also shift demand in either direction, 
depending on whether reliance on livestock income provides an incentive to insure or, given that it is 
largely in-kind, constrains liquidity with which to purchase insurance. Gender differences in education 
and financial literacy have the potential to impact demand for any financial product, yet this would likely 
operate through their understanding of the product which appears to be similar in this case. If there is an 
age dimension to the adoption of new financial products, female-headed households, being older on 
average, may exhibit differential demand. These possibilities will be further explored through regression 
analysis after examining the characteristics of IBLI purchasers and non-purchasers in greater detail. 
 At the aggregate level, there are many differences between purchasers and non-purchasers (Table 
4). Purchasers have larger herds, fewer non-livestock assets and a larger proportion of their income comes 
from livestock, consistent with the idea that dependence on livestock contributes to IBLI demand. 
Purchasers have greater financial literacy and IBLI-specific knowledge, highlighting the importance of 
the relationship between product understanding and uptake, although causality could flow either or both 
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directions between those variables. An interest in the product could induce learning and understanding, or 
exogenous exposure to information that improves one’s understanding of the product could prompt 
purchase of IBLI. Contrary to standard insurance demand theory, IBLI purchasers have lower risk 
aversion, suggesting that IBLI may not be perceived as risk-reducing, yet at the same time purchasers are 
more likely to expect below-normal rangeland conditions. Purchasers had greater access to home-centered 
information sources than non-purchasers, but we see no differences in total information sources between 
these groups. 
 Among women, few differences emerge between purchasers and non-purchasers. Purchasers 
continue to have fewer non-livestock assets, but aggregate differences in herd size and proportion of 
income from livestock do not hold for the female subsample. Female purchasers do appear to give and 
receive less total transfers, suggesting potential for an inverse relationship between informal insurance 
and demand for IBLI. IBLI knowledge remains important for women’s demand. 
 When comparing purchasers by gender, the differences presented in the final columns of Table 4 
largely mirror differences in the population as a whole presented in the final columns of Table 3. Notably, 
the absolute amount of TLU insured is significantly higher for men than for women, yet the proportion of 
herd insured is not significantly different.  
 
Econometric Strategy and Challenges 
 The econometric approach to estimating gender-differentiated demand for IBLI involves 
estimating determinants of an individual’s propensity to insure as well as the level of coverage purchased 
by that individual. The binary purchase decision can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐺𝑖𝑅𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐺𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝛾3𝐺𝑖𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐺𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿0𝐺𝑖 
+ 𝛿1𝑅𝑖 +  𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
 
(1)  
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in which the purchase decision, 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 , by individual i in period t is regressed on gender, 𝐺𝑖, where  
𝐺𝑖 = 1 represents a female-headed household, as well as interactions of 𝐺𝑖 with the variables of interest 
described in detail. 𝑅𝑖 is a vector of dummy variables representing three levels of risk aversion, 𝐼𝑖𝑡 
represents informal insurance coverage in the form of cash and in-kind transfers, while 𝐾𝑖𝑡 represents 
home-centered sources of information about IBLI and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents female assets. We include the first-
order interacted variables and controls for price (𝑃𝑖𝑡), current coverage (𝑉𝑖𝑡−1), and household 
characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑡). We also include 𝑍𝑖𝑡, binary indicator of receipt of the randomly assigned discount 
coupon, independent of the discount received, which is incorporated into the regression as part of 𝑃𝑖𝑡xi. 
The composite error term consists, of 𝜇𝑖, the unobserved individual effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, the idiosyncratic error 
with zero mean, finite variance 𝜎𝜀
2 and distributed i.i.d over all observations. Probit regression of equation 
(1) allows us to estimate the average marginal effects (AME) of the variables of interest on the probability 
of IBLI purchase, allowing for the possibility that they might vary by gender.  
The level of coverage purchased, 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 , can be understood best by incorporating the predicted 
propensity to purchase from the purchase decision results in order to correct for prospective selection bias 
arising from the fact that values of 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡  are only observed when 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1. Level of purchase is 
modeled as 
 
𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛾1𝐺𝑖𝑅𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐺𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾3𝐺𝑖𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐺𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑡 +   𝛿0𝐺𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑅𝑖 
+ 𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝜆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑖 +  𝜉𝑖𝑡 
 
(2) 
 
where 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 is regressed on interaction terms, first-order variables and the same set of controls as the first 
stage. The unobserved individual effect and idiosyncratic error term are represented by 𝜔𝑖 and 𝜉𝑖𝑡, 
respectively. With the discount considered separately, the coupon, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, merely represents a paper reminder 
of the existence of the IBLI product and the idea of purchase. As such, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is justifiably excluded from the 
second-stage regression under the assumption that once the individual has already made his or her 
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purchase decision, the reminder effect of coupon itself is irrelevant to the amount of insurance coverage 
purchased. Following Heckman’s (1979) approach to correcting selection bias, we incorporate the inverse 
Mills ratio. 
 
𝜆𝑖𝑡 =
ϕ(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡)
Φ(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡)
 
(3) 
 
 
When 𝜆𝑖𝑡 is calculated as a function of the same set of covariates in the first stage regression as is used in 
the second stage, selection is theoretically accounted for, but in practice the process is strengthened by the 
inclusion 𝑍𝑖𝑡, the exogenous instrument in the first stage that predicts selection that has no relevance to 
the second stage dependent variable.  
 Recall that in both equations, the composite error term consists of the unobserved individual fixed 
effect and the idiosyncratic error. The unobserved individual fixed effect is likely to induce bias if a 
pooled estimator is used. A fixed-effects estimator may be tempting, but the probit regression is then 
subject to the incidental parameters problem in estimations where the number of observations is large 
relative to the number of time periods, as is the case in these data. Furthermore, we are most interested in 
time-invariant household characteristics, which would wash out in a fixed-effects estimator. A random 
effects estimator will be consistent if the individual effect is uncorrelated with covariates, an assumption 
that is unlikely to hold. Building on Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980), Wooldridge (2002) 
proposes that, to the extent that the individual effect is associated with within-household means of time-
varying household characteristics, incorporating these means as controls can reduce the bias associated 
with a simple pooled estimator in the presence of fixed effects. To do so, time varying covariates in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
are used to generate a set of within-household means, ?̅?𝑖, which are incorporated as additional controls. 
Time-variant elements of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 include herd size, income, income from livestock, expected rangeland 
conditions, household demographic controls, previous period losses, non-livestock assets and cash 
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savings. Time-invariant elements of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 include financial literacy, household head education, and a set of 
geographical dummies. The two-stage Heckman correction is then estimated using 
𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐺𝑖𝑅𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐺𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝛾3𝐺𝑖𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐺𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿0𝐺𝑖 
+ 𝛿1𝑅𝑖 +  𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁?̅?𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
 
(4) 
 
and 
 
𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛾1𝐺𝑖𝑅𝑖 +  𝛾2𝐺𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾3𝐺𝑖𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾4𝐺𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑡 +   𝛿0𝐺𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑅𝑖 
+ 𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝜂𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁0𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁1?̅?𝑖 + 𝛽𝜆𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 
 
(5) 
 
to formally test the following four hypotheses: 
1. The effect of risk aversion (𝑅𝑖) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖). 
 H0:   𝛾1=0 
2. The effect of informal insurance (𝐼𝑖𝑡) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖).  
 H0:   𝛾2=0 
3. The effect of product education (𝐾𝑖𝑡) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖).  
 H0:   𝛾3=0 
4. The effect of female assets (𝐴𝑖𝑡) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖).  
 H0: 𝛾4=0 
 
Econometric Challenges 
 Simultaneity between an individual’s knowledge or understanding of the IBLI product and their 
decision to purchase may leave the knowledge variable correlated with the idiosyncratic error term over 
time. The most logical potential instruments for the knowledge variable are two randomly assigned 
educational treatments implemented in the initial rollout of IBLI in Ethiopia. Preliminary analysis found 
23  
 
these two variables to be only weakly correlated with households’ understanding of the IBLI product over 
the time period in question for this study.xii To the extent that households adjust informal insurance 
behaviors based on whether they have purchased IBLI or not, or their level of coverage, the informal 
insurance variable will also be correlated with the error term. The lagged dependent variable, 𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, 
representing previous period IBLI purchase, or, put otherwise, whether an individual is covered in the 
current period, is likely correlated with household unobservable characteristics that impact the current 
purchase decision. Given the lack of suitable instruments to address these endogenous variables, results 
should be interpreted with this likely endogeneity in mind as reflecting associations between the variables 
but without any clear causal link. Other potentially endogenous variables include herd size and income, 
because income is primarily composed of herd-related income. The extent to which these related variables 
are endogenous depends on the ways in which households adjust their herding practices in response to 
being insured and differences in effects of drought on herd size between those who purchased IBLI and 
those who did not. As of data collection in March 2014, no Ethiopian households had received an IBLI 
indemnity payout. One might expect the credibility of the product and subsequent likelihood of detectable 
behavioral and herd size effects to develop substantially after a payout, but not before.xiii 
 
Econometric Results 
Purchase decision  
 Marginal effects from the first-stage probit regression of the IBLI purchase decision are presented 
in Table 5. We begin with a brief discussion of overall demand patterns that appear consistently across all 
models.xiv We then turn to the gender-specific results associated with the above hypotheses. The 
relationship between IBLI uptake and price is statistically significant, but modest, with a decrease in 
probability of purchase of 0.1 per cent for every 1 per cent increase in price. Where included in the model, 
previous period purchase reduces the probability of purchase by 8.6 per cent. This result is sensible, given 
that the previous purchase period is 5-7 months prior to the current period and an IBLI insurance contract 
lasts 12 months. Therefore, those who purchased in the previous period are currently covered and, 
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assuming they understand the length of the coverage period, they would be less likely to purchase 
supplementary IBLI coverage. Coupon assignment increases the probability of purchase by 4.4 per cent, 
consistent with the assumptions that underpin its use as an instrument in the selection equation. 
Households that expect lower-than-normal rangeland conditions in the coming months are associated with 
a 3.5 per cent increase in the probability of IBLI purchase. Households with high livestock mortality in 
the previous period see a decrease in the probability of purchase of 3.5 per cent. In a society where 
livestock sales are a main source of liquidity, this points to liquidity constraints to access to IBLI.  
 Moving now to gender-specific results, column (1) represents a restricted regression that excludes 
all characteristics that vary visibly by gender in Table 3, as well as any characteristics that have the 
potential to vary systematically by gender. The average marginal effect (AME) of female-headed 
household in this restricted regression is not statistically significantly different from zero. This 
specification implicitly assumes that characteristics such as financial literacy, education or others that are 
excluded from this regression have no effect on the probability of IBLI purchase, so if there is any 
correlation between such variables and gender and the exclusionary assumption is false, the coefficient 
estimate on the gender variable would be biased. What this regression tells us is that when we include all 
of the various gender-related factors, whether mediated by other (currently omitted) characteristics or not, 
there is no variation in IBLI demand by gender. This is consistent with the proportionality of IBLI 
purchase by female-headed households to the number of female-headed households in the population. 
 Even if women’s overall demand for IBLI is neither higher nor lower than men’s, it is still 
possible that women’s demand is driven at least partially by a different set of factors. Therefore, model 
(2) incorporates characteristics that we might expect to vary by gender and to influence IBLI uptake, 
either by shifting slopes or intercepts for women. Similarly, the percentage of income from livestock 
(scaled from 0-100) indicates that for every point increase in the share of income from livestock, the 
probability of purchasing IBLI decreases by a modest 0.1 per cent. The more livestock income one has, 
the less likely one is to purchase IBLI. This contradicts the idea that those who are more dependent on 
livestock income are more vulnerable to drought and would have higher demand for IBLI. This may 
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reflect the superior self-insurance capacity of those with the largest herds; they do not need insurance the 
way those with small or moderate herd sizes do. The statistical differences in mean shares of livestock 
income by gender (Table 3) could translate to a systematically lower likelihood of IBLI purchase by 
women driven by these initial differences, something we will explore briefly in the next section. 
 In model (2), we see no significant coefficient estimates on the interaction terms relating to 
product education, informal insurance and risk aversion and therefore fail to reject the null hypotheses 
that the average marginal effects are equal for men and women along these dimensions. However, the 
significant coefficient estimate on female-headed household suggests that there may be more to the story 
than is captured by our model. Simply being a female-headed household is associated with a 31.7 per cent 
increase in the probability of IBLI purchase, conditional on all observable factors that may differentially 
affect demand. An optimistic explanation is that women’s sensitivity to risk, informal insurance and 
product education experiences are not fully captured by the variables included in the model, leaving 
women’s perception of IBLI’s risk reduction potential captured in the coefficient on female-headed 
household. A less optimistic, but perhaps more likely explanation is that, in a context where IBLI sales 
agents are paid on commission and all sales agents are men, women are more easily pressured to 
purchase. 
 Models (3) and (4) use a sub-sample of two decision maker households to test for a bargaining 
effect associated with female assets in the form of HS animals at marriage and current lactating herd 
proportion. We fail to reject the null that the average marginal effects of female asset holdings on IBLI 
uptake are equal for men and women. A modest, but statistically significant gender difference in the 
marginal effects of total cash and in-kind transfers on the probability of IBLI uptake of 0.4% is identified, 
suggesting that the relationship between informal insurance and IBLI may indeed differ between men and 
women. Either women are covered differently than men in ways that are not captured by the transfers 
variable, or women respond differently to informal insurance coverage than men do. The effect of 
transfers on men’s demand for IBLI is very modestly negative and not statistically significantly different 
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from zero. For women, informal transfers appear to reduce demand for IBLI in a way that they do not for 
men.  
 
Level of purchase results 
 Table 6 presents the effects of a range of factors on the level of IBLI coverage purchased, 
conditional on the inverse Mills ratio to control for prospective selection effects. Independent of gender, 
several general demand findings are worth mentioning. IBLI demand is price inelastic, with estimated 
elasticities in the range of -0.33 to -0.46. This is consistent with price elasticities identified in a separate 
study of IBLI demand in neighboring Marsabit, Kenya (Jensen et al., 2014). Age of household head is 
negatively associated with the level of purchase. As with the purchase decision model, there appears to be 
no gender variation in IBLI demand as indicated by the lack of significant coefficient on female-headed 
household in model (1).  
 As with the purchase decision estimation, model (2) incorporates all variables that potentially 
shift slopes or intercepts by gender. Unlike in the purchase decision model, here we do not see a 
significant marginal effect on female-headed household, suggesting that any effect related to sales agent 
pressure might be restricted to the decision to purchase and other factors drive the chosen level of 
coverage. A single point increase in the IBLI knowledge score is associated with a 4.1 per cent increase in 
TLU insured. Interestingly, the relationship between the education level of the household head and the 
level of IBLI purchase is negative, suggesting that each additional year of education is associated with a 
5.1 per cent decrease in the TLU insured. If education and social status are correlated, this is consistent 
with the idea that lower status may result in vulnerability to pressure by educated, commission-motivated 
sales agents. This may reflect the gap between sales agents’ education and household heads, both male 
and female, in Borana. This may lead those with less education relative to the sales agents, to purchase 
higher TLU coverage than they otherwise would, were they positioned differently in society. However, it 
is not clear why this effect would exist only for the level of purchase estimations. 
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 A change of one standard deviation in non-livestock assets is associated with a 14 per cent 
decrease in TLU insured. One might think that households holding diverse assets are less vulnerable to 
the threat of livestock mortality due to drought when such assets tend to be related to non-pastoralist 
livelihoods. Yet at the same time one would not expect to see this effect operating through assets where 
estimates are conditioned on non-livestock income levels. In this case, proportion of income from 
livestock is included as a control and is not statistically significant, therefore we consider this result with 
caution. 
 When gender is interacted with variables of interest in models (2) and (3), we fail to reject the 
hypotheses that there are no gender differences in the relationships between IBLI demand and cash and 
in-kind transfers. Female asset holdings in the form of HS animals appear to have no gender-
differentiated effect in model (3), unlike current lactating herd proportion in model (4) where we see a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term. This suggests that women in two-decision-maker households 
with more lactating animals have less incentive to insure, perhaps due to the increased ability to self-
insure, combined with a better bargaining position. We do, however, reject the null that the average 
marginal effect of high risk aversion differs between men and women. The effect of high risk aversion on 
males, represented by the coefficient on high risk aversion alone, is positive but not statistically 
significantly different from zero. High risk aversion increases women’s purchase of IBLI by 36 per cent 
compared to an equally risk averse man. Insurance demand theory suggests that as risk aversion increases, 
demand for insurance also increases. This effect disappears when we control for female assets brought 
into the marriage in model (3). Gender and moderate risk aversion appear to have a similar, but opposite 
effect in model (4), but again only weakly and in one specification. Lastly, in model (3) only we reject the 
null that the effect of home-centered information sources varies by gender, finding that women’s IBLI 
purchase level is slightly more responsive (0.4%) to home-centered information than men’s. 
 
Discussion 
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 Neither the IBLI purchase decision nor the level of IBLI coverage chosen demonstrate gender-
differentiated demand when tested using the restricted regressions discussed above. Yet further analysis 
suggests that there are several pathways for gender-differentiated drivers of demand for IBLI, even if they 
do not amount to differences in demand outcomes. We first discuss gender differences in average 
marginal effects, and then discuss how differences in initial conditions may shape demand for women in 
relation to men. 
 Risk aversion appears to have an appreciably different effect on IBLI demand for women than for 
men, but the direction of the effect is ambiguous in the measures we use. Future improvements that 
incorporate risk aversion measures that are appropriate to the context and decision-making domain could 
contribute to understanding this gender difference. Better understanding of gender and the perceived risks 
associated with IBLI specifically is also essential. Qualitative respondents, who were mostly women, 
appeared to accept IBLI’s risk-reducing claims at face value, while simultaneously maintaining a wait-
and-see attitude toward initial or further purchase. Perceptions of IBLI as helpful were overwhelmingly 
positive (86%), despite no one having received an insurance payout. Some degree of response bias is 
likely, given that non-local IBLI staff were involved in qualitative data collection. As individuals learn 
about IBLI from experiences such as witnessing payouts or lack of payouts to themselves or their 
neighbors, understanding of the risks and benefits of the product will further develop. Post-payout data on 
these topics will be useful to understanding the relationship between risk-aversion and IBLI demand. 
 For women, informal insurance has a negative effect on the IBLI purchase decision that is 
modestly different from the effect for men with equal informal insurance coverage, as we have measured 
it. The nature and extent of coverage by informal risk management underpins the perceived benefits of 
IBLI relative to other risk management approaches and using total transfers may not adequately capture 
gender differences informal insurance coverage. Qualitative respondents stated unanimously that access 
to basic levels of informal risk management in the form of mutual assistance and reciprocity is driven by 
need rather than social connectedness or wealth. If need is defined by the household’s material and labor 
resources, then it is captured in our model through herd size, income, assets and dependency ratio 
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controls. However, qualitative respondents described the extent of coverage provided by mutual 
assistance as a function of the ‘good behavior’ of the individual, defined as pro-social behaviors 
encompassing all manners of helping others to the best of one’s ability given one’s material and labor 
resources. Better understanding of the overall effect of informal insurance on IBLI uptake using data 
designed for such purposes will contribute to future understanding of any gender-differentiated effects. 
 I find some evidence of a gender-differentiated effect of home-based product information. This 
suggests that targeting marketing strategies to women through home-centered education may provide a 
gender-differentiated benefit, and further consideration of the means of education that women prefer 
would be needed if improved targeting of women is a goal. Considerable confusion among qualitative 
respondents regarding the definition of insuraansii horrii (IBLI) in the context of the product education 
module of the survey points to unusually high levels of random noise in this variable, which may limit 
statistical identification by attenuating any true effect. 
 I also find contradicting evidence of an intra-household bargaining effect associated with female 
assets — lactating animals and horrii siiqqee — despite the latter’s local relevance. Though we cannot 
know for sure, the significance of lactating animals for women may be less indicative of bargaining than 
indicative of capacity to self-insure. If bargaining is not taking place around IBLI, this implies that 
gender-based targeting in two-adult households is not relevant to increasing access to IBLI in this context. 
Combined with the finding that female headed households are responsive to home-based information 
sources, this suggests that gender-based targeting could focus specifically on single-adult female headed 
households. However, given a significant body of evidence that contradicts the presence of identical 
preferences among household members, these findings point to a need for further exploration of intra-
household decision making in Borana.xv  
 Even where AMEs do not differ, gender differences in averages of key characteristics may also 
play a role in gender-differentiated IBLI demand patterns. Proportion of income from livestock and age 
are, on average, lower and higher, respectively for women relative to men. Multiplying the statistically 
significant AMEs from Tables 6 and 7, we see that average differences in proportion of income from 
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livestock translate to a 2.8 per cent increased likelihood of IBLI purchase by women, while age 
differences account for a modest 0.5 per cent decrease in the same. No other characteristics with gender-
differentiated averages had statistically significant effects on IBLI demand. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 This paper provides an initial perspective on dimensions of demand for index based livestock 
insurance that might vary by gender, using a carefully conceptualized combination of data from a 
household survey, administrative records and structured qualitative interviews. Female-headed 
households purchase IBLI at the same rate as men, relative to their share of the population, yet the factors 
that drive women’s demand appear to diverge slightly from men’s. Econometrically, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the AMEs of risk aversion and informal insurance are equal to zero for the level of 
purchase and purchase decision models, respectively. The estimated average marginal effects of high risk 
aversion and informal insurance coverage have, respectively, positive and negative associations with IBLI 
demand by women. We reject the null that home-based product education have no gender-differentiated 
effect, and find that women are more responsive to home-based product education than men. We fail to 
reject the null that female HS assets have no gender-differentiated effects, a finding that contradicts much 
empirical evidence on intrahousehold bargaining. At the same time, we reject the null that female assets 
in the form of lactating animals have a gender-differentiated effect, which we interpret as a result of 
women’s increased capacity to self-insure. We find that women’s demand differs from men’s due to 
differences in household head age and income shares from livestock. The largest gender-differentiated 
demand effects likely relate to women’s lower social status, which is positively associated with the 
decision to purchase IBLI, possibly through women’s vulnerability to pressure by sales agents. These 
results are consistent with Takahashi et al. (2015) whose gender control variables suggest that being 
female increases the likelihood of purchase, but not the level of coverage purchased. 
 In addition to aiding in econometric specification and interpretation, qualitative data suggest that 
variables used to understand information sources and informal insurance may not capture these concepts 
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precisely. Specifically, differences in informal insurance coverage and access may be driven by omitted 
variables reflecting pro-social behaviors and general confusion in terminology surrounding the IBLI 
product generate considerable noise in variables relating to the marketing experience of the household, 
such as IBLI information sources. A case is made for further investigation of the topic using data that 
captures difficult-to-observe dynamics that may underpin locally defined behavioral aspects of informal 
insurance access and gender differences in perceptions of IBLI’s risk reduction potential, as well as 
ongoing reduction of measurement error in key variables such as IBLI information sources. Future 
findings can be leveraged to develop tools and strategies for ensuring that access to and benefits from 
innovative financial products are equitably distributed across the population.  
 Lastly, the negative effect of education on IBLI uptake, along with the strong and positive effect 
of being female, merits a closer look IBLI marketing and sales processes in order to understand whether 
the methods and strategies used encourage IBLI purchase induce a gender or other effect that inflates 
IBLI purchase based on social pressure rather than the product’s potential to reduce risk and limit the 
effects of catastrophic drought. Employing sales strategies that encourage information-based choice to 
purchase IBLI will contribute to sustainable demand over the long term.  
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i NDVI images used in the construction of the IBLI contract has resolution of 8km2 and is taken every 10 days from 
a U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association satellite used largely for weather forecasting (Chantarat et al., 
2013).  
ii Note that reeras were not selected randomly and therefore cannot be said to be representative of the regional state, 
woredas or kebeles from which they were drawn. Reera-level population data outside of the selected reeras is not 
available.  
iii Households were defined as ‘a group of people who live in the same homestead (which may consist of more than a 
single dwelling) and share food and other items bought from a common household budget.’  In the context of 
polygamous marriages, one husband can have multiple wives and each wife may or may not have a separate 
household (ILRI, 2014). 
iv Rainfall data from Lasage et al., 2010. 
v See Appendix A for further details on panel construction. See Appendix B for complete attrition analysis.  
vi TLU, or tropical livestock units, are calculated based on metabolic weight. 1 TLU = 1 bovine = 0.7 camel = 10 
sheep/goats. 
vii The only exception was for participants in ILRI’s annual herd migration survey, who had a 50 per cent chance of 
receiving a 100 per cent voucher for IBLI purchase up to 15 TLU. Only ten households received the 100 per cent 
voucher in a given sales period. 
viii Unforseen changes in marital status and purchase behavior resulted in only 15 out of the intended 16 households 
being interviewed. 
ix Four respondents had no household members participating in groups. 
x According to the survey data, the most important information sources for both male- and female-headed 
households were community meetings and NGOs, followed by the insurance company and informal conversations 
with friends and family. Qualitative data contradict this. All respondents who attended community meetings where 
IBLI was discussed reported not effectively learning about the IBLI product at community meetings. No one 
reported community meetings as a preferred channel, though for many people they were the only product-focused 
channel, which may explain why this was chosen as ‘most important’ in the survey data. No one indicated that they 
learned about the IBLI product from informal conversations with friends and family. The category ‘NGO’ meant 
different things to different people, including ILRI, OIC or anyone who comes to the community in a car.  
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xi The effective price of IBLI per TLU of coverage, accounts for discount coupons received in addition to spatial and 
temporal price variations. However, IBLI is priced by species, not TLU. Therefore, the price facing each individual 
depends on the animals they choose to insure. For simplicity, we have calculated the effective TLU price as the price 
of insuring one cow rather than using the actual prices paid for the diverse combinations of animals individuals 
chose to insure. The latter method makes it difficult to define a price for those who chose not to purchase IBLI. 
xii First-stage regressions of IBLI knowledge on assigned cartoon and assigned tape for the time period used in this 
study yield p-values ranging from 0.05-0.88, depending on the specification. In their study of IBLI demand using the 
same data, but only the first two sales periods, Takahashi et al (2015) instrument for IBLI knowledge using the 
educational treatments. Their first-stage regressions suggest that the instrument is weak in the first purchase period, 
but acceptable in the second. Given that these interventions were only used in the first year of IBLI implementation, 
it is sensible that their influence on knowledge wanes over time and is not visible in the third and fourth purchase 
periods. 
xiii The first indemnity payments under the IBLI contracts were made in November 2014, outside the time span of 
the data analyzed here. 
xiv These results are consistent across all specifications, including those using reported IBLI purchase rather than 
OIC record of purchase. Those results can be found in Appendix D. 
xv Empirical tests of intrahousehold bargaining following Thomas (1990) reveal non-identical preferences across 
several household expenditure classes (sugar, tobacco, cooking fuel, and education) using lactating herd and HS 
animals. These results are reported in Appendix D, Table D5. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: IBLI Information Sources 
Product-focused channels Home-centered channels Neither 
Prevalence 
(%) 
OIC staff 
  
11.8% 
Television 
  
1.2% 
Posters 
  
4.6% 
Cooperatives/Network Groups 
  
3.7% 
Community meetings 
  
49.2% 
Radio Radio 
 
4.3% 
DAs (cartoon/tape) DAs (cartoon/tape) 
 
37.1% 
 
ILRI household survey 
 
76.2% 
 
NGOs 
 
1.6% 
 
Neighbors, friends and relatives 
 
52.9% 
  
Discount coupon distribution 50.1% 
  DAs (non-cartoon/tape) 64.8% 
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Table 2:  Panel Household Characteristics 
    Frequency Per cent 
Head Gender Female Head 97 20.9 
Male Head 367 79.1 
Total 464 100.0 
Marital Status of 
Female Heads 
Never married 2 2.1 
Married 19 19.6 
Divorced/separated 8 8.2 
Widowed 68 70.1 
Total 97 100.0 
Ethnic Group Borana 427 92.0 
Guji 36 7.8 
Gabra 1 0.2 
Total 464 100.0 
Religion Traditional 385 83.0 
Muslim 18 3.9 
Orthodox 1 0.2 
Protestant 42 9.1 
Catholic 7 1.5 
Other Christian 11 2.4 
Total 464 100.0 
Settlement Status Fully Settled 356 76.7 
Partially Settled 72 15.5 
Nomadic 36 7.8 
Total 464 100.0 
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Table 3:  Panel Household Characteristics Disaggregated by Gender of Household Head (R3) 
   Aggregate   Male Head   Female Head   Differences  
   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Male-Fem   (t-stat)  
 Herd size (TLU)   18.43   25.87   20.63   27.61   10.00   15.08   10.6***  (5.22) 
 Total Income (ETB)   3,750.00   5,853.00   4,122.00   6,233.00   2,328.00   3,780.00   1794.2***  (3.68) 
 Cash Income (ETB)   357.40   3,397.00   361.70   3,677.00   340.80   2,009.00   20.9  (0.077) 
 Proportion of income from livestock   81.82   28.93   84.71   25.73   70.77   36.93   13.9***  (3.61) 
 Cash Savings (ETB)   1,493.00   9,791.00   1,709.00   10,802.00   669.40   3,986.00   1039.8  (1.55) 
 Asset Index   0.00   1.00   0.04   1.04   (0.15)  0.83   0.19  (1.91) 
 All Transfers   237.80   317.30   257.20   341.60   163.70   181.60   93.5***  (3.76) 
 Network Groups   0.96   0.93   1.05   0.95   0.62   0.77   0.42***  (4.74) 
 Education   3.29   3.13   3.32   3.16   3.16   3.04   0.16  (0.45) 
 Household Head Education   0.52   1.84   0.62   2.02   0.15   0.85   0.47***  (3.46) 
 Financial Literacy   4.16   1.27   4.26   1.19   3.78   1.50   0.48**  (2.98) 
 Age of Head   51.78   17.96   50.81   17.72   55.53   18.48   -4.72*  (-2.32) 
 Household Size   7.28   2.81   7.69   2.83   5.70   2.11   1.99***  (7.88) 
 Dependency ratio   1.39   0.87   1.35   0.74   1.54   1.24   -0.20  (-1.53) 
 Low risk aversion   0.39   0.49   0.39   0.49   0.41   0.49   -0.019  (-0.36) 
 Moderate risk aversion   0.43   0.50   0.43   0.50   0.45   0.50   -0.020  (-0.37) 
 High risk aversion   0.18   0.38   0.19   0.39   0.15   0.35   0.040  (0.99) 
 Expected rangeland below normal   0.46   0.50   0.45   0.50   0.49   0.50   -0.031  (-0.56) 
 Expected rangeland normal   0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   -0.0040  (-0.079) 
 Expected rangeland above normal   0.24   0.43   0.25   0.43   0.21   0.41   0.035  (0.76) 
 Home-Centered Info Sources   37.22   20.00   37.59   19.67   35.81   21.26   1.78  (0.77) 
 IBLI Knowledge   4.91   1.80   4.96   1.82   4.73   1.72   0.23  (1.21) 
 Effective price per TLU   280.00   134.00   281.60   132.10   273.60   141.40   8.00  (0.52) 
 IBLI Purchase --Reported  0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   -0.0015  (-0.029) 
 IBLI Purchase--OIC  0.08   0.27   0.08   0.27   0.08   0.27   -0.0015  (-0.051) 
 TLU Insured—Reported (n=149)   2.49   5.07   2.87   5.62  1.05   0.99   1.19  (1.79) 
 TLU Insured--OIC (n=38)  4.41   6.26   4.96   6.49   2.33   5.16 2.64  (1.06) 
 Percent herd insured--Reported  (n=149)  0.03   0.14   0.03   0.16   0.03   0.09   0.00006  (0.0021) 
 Percent herd insured--OIC  (n=38) 0.28   0.42   0.28   0.45   0.29   0.33  -0.0124  (-0.0072) 
 Observations  497 394 103 497 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 4: Differences Between Purchasers and Non-Purchasers, and Purchasers By Gender (OIC Records) 
  Aggregate Female Purchasers by Gender 
  
Purch - 
Non t-statistic 
Purch - 
Non t-statistic 
Male-
Female t-statistic 
Herd size (TLU) 6.28** (2.85) -0.96 (-0.63) 18.8*** (6.43) 
Total Income (ETB) -351.3 (-1.48) 45.9 (0.14) 1174.7** (3.05) 
Cash Income (ETB) -52.8 (-0.80) -91.4 (-0.85) 69.5 (0.82) 
Proportion of income from livestock -7.66*** (-3.55) -0.0043 (-0.0009) 3.99 (0.78) 
Cash Savings (ETB) 3018.6 (1.89) 243.3 (0.39) 4515.7* (2.17) 
Asset Index -0.077** (-2.79) -0.091* (-2.28) 0.11*** (3.52) 
Total Value of Transfers 21.0 (0.27) -57.6* (-2.41) 173.6 (1.76) 
Network Groups 0.10 (1.90) -0.010 (-0.13) 0.53*** (5.77) 
Education 0.21 (1.09) 0.46 (1.05) -0.024 (-0.052) 
Household Head Education -0.15 (-1.44) 0.075 (0.58) 0.26 (1.57) 
Financial Literacy 0.17* (2.21) 0.17 (0.85) 0.51** (2.68) 
Age of Head -1.10 (-1.03) -4.86 (-1.94) -1.21 (-0.48) 
Household Size -0.26 (-1.68) -0.077 (-0.32) 1.69*** (6.36) 
Dependency ratio 0.0082 (0.14) 0.087 (0.47) -0.43* (-2.45) 
Low risk aversion 0.077* (2.51) 0.12 (1.78) -0.059 (-0.86) 
Moderate risk aversion -0.020 (-0.67) -0.082 (-1.25) 0.057 (0.85) 
High risk aversion -0.056** (-2.89) -0.037 (-0.89) 0.0019 (0.045) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.077* (2.50) 0.048 (0.71) 0.073 (1.06) 
Expected rangeland normal -0.035 (-1.33) -0.033 (-0.56) -0.012 (-0.20) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.041 (-1.65) -0.015 (-0.26) -0.060 (-1.03) 
Total IBLI Info Sources 0.18 (1.86) 0.26 (1.49) 0.31 (1.68) 
Home-Centered Info Sources 2.57* (2.00) 1.34 (0.48) 1.30 (0.47) 
IBLI Knowledge 0.52*** (5.27) 0.74*** (3.63) 0.013 (0.062) 
Effective price per TLU -93.8*** (-11.2) -68.7*** (-4.55) -26.3 (-1.63) 
IBLI Purchase—Reported 
    
0.0038 (0.068) 
TLU Insured—Reported 
    
1.25*** (4.67) 
TLU Insured—OIC Records 
    
2.39*** (5.91) 
Percent of herd insured--Reported 
    
-0.27 (-0.93) 
Percent of herd insured--OIC Records 
    
-0.27 (-0.90) 
Observations 1940   404   316   
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 5: IBLI Purchase Decision 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female headed household 0.069 0.317*** 0.552** 0.481** 
 
(0.159) (0.123) (0.223) (0.207) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 
  
-0.127 
 
   
(0.086) 
 HS at marriage 
  
0.015 
 
   
(0.021) 
 Female Head X Lactating herd 
   
-0.083 
    
(0.093) 
ln Lactating herd proportion 
   
-0.021 
    
(0.020) 
Female Head X Home info 
 
-0.0002 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.001) 
Home-centered information 
 
0.0004 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female Head X Transfers 
 
-0.001 -0.043** -0.042** 
  
(0.009) (0.021) (0.021) 
ln Transfers 
 
-0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.019 -0.060 -0.027 
  
(0.030) (0.060) (0.059) 
Moderate risk aversion 
 
0.007 0.007 0.007 
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Female Head X High risk aversion 
 
-0.046 -0.021 -0.157 
  
(0.050) (0.155) (0.156) 
High risk aversion 
 
0.004 -0.111 -0.113 
  
(0.684) (0.704) (0.698) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.117*** -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Lagged IBLI purchase 
 
-0.191*** -0.179*** -0.181*** 
  
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Dependency ratio 0.005 -0.012 -0.047** -0.046** 
 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.069** 0.035* 0.026 0.028 
 
(0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) 
ln Previous period losses (TLU) -0.016 -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Assigned coupon 0.063** 0.044** 0.031 0.032 
 
(0.030) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age of household head 
 
-0.061*** -0.060** -0.058** 
  
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age squared 
 
0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
  
(0.00016) (0.00019) (0.00019) 
Proportion of income from livestock 
 
-0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Household Average Controls HAC1 HAC2 HAC2 HAC2 
     Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 1,526 
LR Chi2 252.93 706.9 703.71 709.26 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The following coefficients are non-significant and not 
reported:  Savings, non-livestock assets, income, herd size, head education, financial literacy, IBLI knowledge and 
expected rangeland above normal. HAC1 includes dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions and effective price. 
HAC2 contains head age and age-squared, non-livestock assets, income, proportion of income from livestock, cash 
savings, previous period purchase, effective price, IBLI knowledge and all HAC1. 
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Table 6:  Level of IBLI Purchase 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female headed household 0.100 0.144 -0.057 0.233 
 
(0.408) (0.454) (0.731) (0.676) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 
  
0.286 
 
   
(0.364) 
 HS at marriage 
  
-0.038 
 
   
(0.070) 
 Female Head X Lactating herd 
   
-0.710* 
    
(0.408) 
ln Lactating herd proportion 
   
0.169** 
    
(0.077) 
Female Head X Home info 
 
-0.003 0.002 0.003 
  
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Home-centered information 
 
0.003 0.004* 0.003 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers 
 
-0.015 0.001 0.013 
  
(0.037) (0.071) (0.070) 
ln Transfers 
 
0.024 0.020 0.020 
  
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.104 -0.287 -0.407* 
  
(0.128) (0.236) (0.225) 
Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.021 -0.035 -0.034 
  
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057) 
Female Head X High risk aversion 
 
0.358* -0.566 -0.104 
  
(0.208) (0.784) (0.493) 
High risk aversion 
 
0.138 1.234 1.002 
  
(2.914) (2.932) (2.884) 
IBLI knowledge 
 
0.041* 0.048* 0.042 
  
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Head Education 
 
-0.051*** -0.056*** -0.051*** 
  
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.463*** -0.327*** -0.347*** -0.350*** 
 
(0.072) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) 
Lagged IBLI purchase 
 
0.015 -0.024 -0.035 
  
(0.095) (0.092) (0.091) 
Age of household head 
 
-0.005 -0.073 -0.148* 
  
(0.067) (0.086) (0.087) 
Age squared 
 
0.0002 0.001 0.001* 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset Index 
 
-0.139* -0.188** -0.165** 
  
(0.076) (0.079) (0.078) 
lambda 0.341 -0.134 -0.09 -0.091 
 
(0.219) (0.084) (0.067) (0.065) 
Constant 3.008*** 3.330*** 3.421*** 3.640*** 
 
(0.217) (0.545) (0.592) (0.589) 
     Household Average Controls HAC1 HAC2 HAC2 HAC2 
     Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 1,526 
Chi2 328.7 861.7 855.6 888.8 
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The following coefficients are non-significant and 
not reported:  Financial literacy, expected rangeland conditions, previous period losses, proportion of income from 
livestock,(ln) herd size, dependency ratio, cash savings, (ln) income. HAC1 includes dependency ratio, expected 
rangeland conditions and effective price.  HAC2 contains head age and age-squared, non-livestock assets, income, 
proportion of income from livestock, cash savings, previous period purchase, effective price, IBLI knowledge and 
all HAC1. 
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APPENDIX A:  Panel and Variable Construction 
 
 
 
Panel Structure 
 The Borana household data are collected annually, but the structure of the questionnaire involves 
seasonal recall for many variables of interest to this analysis. Seasonal recall uses four seasons:  long rain, 
long dry, short rain and short dry, which we combine into long rain + long dry (LRLD) and short rain + 
short dry (SRSD). The IBLI purchase periods are in August/September and January/February, at the end 
of each SRSD and LRLD period. The panel is analyzed by period, but data are collected by “round” as 
described in Table A1. Variables that are not collected using the seasonal recall structure, require an 
assumption to be made based on the nature of the variable in order to determine the value at the 
intermediate period. Any assumptions and other information about variable construction are described in 
detail below.  
 
Table A1:  Panel Structure 
Time Period Season Period (P) Round (R) 
March-Sept 2012 LRLD P1 
 Oct 2011-Feb 2012 SRSD P2 R1 
March-Sept 2012 LRLD P3 
 Oct-Feb 2013 SRSD P4 R2 
March-Sept 2013 LRLD P5 
 Oct 2013-Feb 2014 SRSD P6 R3 
 
 
Gender of Household Head 
 The gender of the household head is virtually time invariant in the current data, with the 
exception of six observations where the gender of the household head changed. For these we chose to use 
the within-household mode, which also happened to be the gender of the household head at the time that 
IBLI was introduced.  
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Marital Status 
 Marital status is collected using five categories:  Never married, married, consensual partner, 
divorced and widowed. From the point of view of our analysis, consensual partnership (n=4) is 
functionally equivalent to marriage in that it creates a dual decision maker household, therefore we 
merged the consensual partner category with the married category. This allows consensual partner 
households to be included in dual decision maker analyses. Marital status for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed 
to be the same as P2, P4 and P6, respectively. 
 During data collection at P6, extra care was taken in collecting marital status data. Households 
headed by widows often reported that they were married. These errors were corrected in previous rounds 
by analyzing household member deaths. For households where the husband died in a previous round, the 
wife’s marital status was adjusted to widowed after that point and married before. For households where 
there was no record of the husband’s death, the death was assumed to have happened prior to survey 
implementation and therefore the wife’s marital status was adjusted to widowed for all survey periods. 
 
Herd Size 
 The size and species composition of animals herded by the household was collected at P2, P4 and 
P6, along with seasonal mortality, birth, offtake and slaughter information. This information is used to 
calculate the P1, P3 and P5 values for these variables. Herd information is then converted to Tropical 
Livestock Units (TLU) based on species metabolic weight to allow for aggregation across species. 
Borrowing from previous researchers in this area, 1 TLU = 1 bovine = 0.7 camel = 10 sheep/goats 
(McPeak et al. 2011, Lybbert et al. 2004, Jensen et al. 2014).  
 
Total Income 
 Income is calculated as monthly average cash and in-kind income and includes labor market 
participation, milk production, livestock sales, livestock slaughters, aid and cash income from other 
sources. Total income excludes informal cash and in-kind transfers.  
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 Daily average milk production per animal was valued using average market prices by species and 
season reported by households that sold milk. Price data were too sparse to calculate prices by each of the 
four seasons, so two seasonal sets of prices—dry and rainy—were used. This daily average milk value 
was then multiplied by 30.4 (average days per month) to get monthly average milk income.  
 Livestock that was sold and slaughtered was valued at median sale price by species and rainy/dry 
season. Similar to milk prices, livestock sales data were too sparse across all 16 season/species 
combinations, we aggregated seasonal prices into dry and rainy season prices. Given high variance in 
reported prices and the presence of extreme outliers, we opted to use median season/species prices. We 
then estimated the animal sales revenue using transactions that were reported as sales, excluding gifts, 
loans and repayment of debts. While these non-sale transactions most certainly have value to households, 
assigning monetary values to these cases is problematic. Some of these activities are captured in the 
livestock transfers variable. The estimated prices ignore animal age, quality, and sex that are likely 
determinants of price but that we cannot capture. The alternative is to use prices as reported by 
households for livestock sales, but the problem of valuing slaughtered animals remains. The argument for 
using reported prices is that they may be more likely to correspond to the market value of the specific 
animals sold better than mean or median prices.  
 Income from aid was reported by respondents as average monthly values of supplementary 
feeding, food aid and other aid. Respondents identified the number of months in the previous year that 
they received these three types of aid, which was then multiplied by the monthly value to get a yearly 
value of aid. This yearly value was apportioned to the panel periods by the number of months in the 
period and that value was used to create an average monthly value for each panel period. 
 Cash income is calculated using respondent recall of income and income source by season (panel 
period). Seasons are then divided by the number of months therein to obtain monthly average cash 
income for corresponding periods. All income is included except that from sale of livestock, sale of milk 
and NGO work. This income should be captured in milk, offtake and other assistance sections of the 
survey. 
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Cash Savings 
 Cash savings are reported by respondents in P2, P4 and P6, but there are no data on savings 
fluctuations between these periods, making it difficult to determine an appropriate value for P1 and P3. 
Currently, total savings data are only used descriptively and not in panel analysis. In the panel analysis, 
we use a dummy variable to represent having enough savings to insure five cattle. For P1, P3 and P5 we 
use the P2, P4 and P6 values of this dummy variable. 
 
Asset Index 
 The asset index is constructed using principal components analysis on 58 non-livestock durable 
goods. Each item is listed in Table A2, along with the associated factor loadings for each survey round. 
Each variable is a count of the number of that item owned by household. Items for which there was zero 
ownership and/or zero variance, such as motorcycles and satellite dishes, were excluded. Complete stock 
of durable goods and housing amenities was taken at P2 and changes were collected at P4 and P6, 
allowing for calculation of P4 and P6 stocks. Any recall error at P4 will carry over to P6. For now, values 
for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be the same as P2, P4 and P6, respectively, though there is little basis 
for this assumption besides convenience. The assets section is one of the more tedious sections of the 
survey and is poorly tailored to the Borana context. Both enumerators and respondents regularly 
expressed frustration with the assets module. The stocks and flows nature of the data collection strategy 
creates potential for measurement error from previous periods to carry through to current periods and to 
accumulate over time.  
Table A2:  PCA Factor Loadings 
Asset P1/P2 P3/P4  P5/P6 
Animal Bell 0.303 0.609 0.233 
Animal Cart -0.135 . 0.217 
Anvil 0.080 0.215 . 
Axe 0.401 0.922 0.431 
Barbering Items 0.399 0.642 0.013 
Basin 0.400 0.855 0.207 
Beads 0.249 0.628 0.114 
Bedframe -0.001 . -0.021 
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Bicycle 0.192 . . 
Box or Trunk 0.380 0.673 0.199 
Brickmold 0.256 0.215 0.467 
Bucket 0.317 0.332 . 
Mobile Phone 0.436 0.603 0.061 
Chair 0.282 . 0.244 
Hammer 0.318 0.147 0.064 
Cup 0.006 0.944 0.570 
Dresser 0.220 . . 
Gourd 0.173 0.915 0.704 
Grinding Mill 0.208 0.370 0.227 
Traditional Healer Items -0.063 . 0.000 
Hides or Pelts 0.064 0.910 0.498 
Hoe 0.264 0.470 0.421 
Jerrycan 0.287 0.965 0.689 
Jewelry 0.107 0.303 0.104 
Knife 0.339 0.945 0.264 
Machete 0.257 0.540 0.143 
Mat 0.121 0.160 0.499 
Mattress 0.492 0.425 0.290 
Mosquito Net 0.328 0.824 0.075 
Motorcycle 0.153 . 0.060 
Natural Bed 0.120 0.808 0.590 
Oven 0.056 . . 
Pannier 0.392 0.376 0.471 
Paraffin Lamp 0.334 0.331 0.079 
Pickaxe 0.337 0.507 0.333 
Plow 0.209 0.593 0.173 
Chisel 0.367 0.640 0.513 
Radio 0.331 0.358 0.134 
Shelves 0.167 0.353 0.094 
Shop 0.192 . 0.019 
Sickle 0.466 0.481 0.251 
Sofa 0.120 . . 
Spade 0.428 0.589 0.344 
Spear or Club 0.307 0.553 0.381 
Stocks . . -0.009 
Stall -0.107 . . 
Stool 0.095 0.959 0.775 
Natural Stove 0.197 0.254 -0.032 
Kerosene Stove -0.073 . . 
Cooking Pot 0.243 0.969 0.684 
Table 0.050 . -0.016 
Television 0.077 . . 
Thermos 0.268 0.350 0.195 
Till 0.064 . . 
Wardrobe 0.208 . 0.099 
Watch 0.363 0.356 0.329 
Water Drum -0.130 0.263 . 
Wheelbarrow 0.150 . -0.038 
Where loading is missing, variable was dropped due to limited variance in that survey 
round. 
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Cash and In-kind Transfers Received and Given 
 Transfers data are reported by respondents using the seasonal recall structure, allowing for 
calculation of season-specific values for all periods, which are then divided by the number of months in 
the period to create monthly averages for transfers received and transfers given. In regressions, transfers 
are represented as the total of the absolute values of transfers in both directions. 
 
Education 
 Education is education level of the household head, in years. Through grade 12, each grade 
corresponds to one year. Beyond that, education levels were re-scaled to correspond to the number of 
years of education associated with each level of attainment. Education data are collected in full at P2, and 
then only information on household members who enter and leave school are collected in later periods. 
To calculate the attainment of an individual, one must make an assumption about whether individuals in 
school advance to the next grade. We assume that all individuals advance every year they are in school. 
Educational attainment of the household head for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be the same as P2, P4 and 
P6, respectively 
 
Financial Literacy 
 Financial literacy is the number of correct answers to the seven questions listed below. Financial 
literacy data were collected only at baseline and is treated as a time-invariant characteristic.  
 If you have 6 female goats and 3 male goats, how many goats do you have in total? 
 If you have 4 cattle subherds with each subherd with 5 animals, how many animals do you have 
in total? 
 If you have 400 goats and subdivide then into 10 equal subherds, how many goats are in each 
subherd? 
 I will read the following digits. Please listen to me, memorize it, and tell me the number: 369219? 
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 Suppose you want to borrow some money, and you have to pay back Birr 10 for every Birr 100 
that you borrow. This is called interest rate. Are you familiar with this concept? 
 Suppose you borrow Birr 100 , and you have to pay back Birr 10 every month for every Birr 100 
that you borrow. If you have not repaid any of the total for a period of three months, how much 
do you owe at the end of the 3 months? 
 Suppose you need to borrow Birr 500. Two people offer you a loan. One requires you to pay back 
Birr 600 in a month. The second requires you to pay back Birr 500 plus Birr 15 for every Birr 
100 you borrow that month. Which loan represents a better deal for you? 
 
Dependency Ratio 
 The dependency ratio is calculated as the number of dependents divided by the number of adults. 
Children are defined as those aged 15 and under, while adults are defined as those older than 15. We 
omitted elderly dependents due to suspected age inflation in the right tail. Including elderly dependents 
created households without adults. Ages for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be equal to P2, P4 and P6, 
respectively.  
 
Household Size  
 Household size is a simple count of the number of members listed in the household roster. We do 
not have data on household size fluctuation between survey rounds and we assume that household sizes at 
P1, P3 and P5 are equal to P2, P4 and P6, respectively. 
 
Risk Aversion 
 Risk aversion is measured at baseline using a coin toss gamble where risk and return are 
positively correlated. The respondent is presented with the following introduction: 
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Let me introduce you to a lottery, whose value depends on the outcome of a coin. We am going to 
flip a coin. In each lottery, if the coin lands on head, you will win the amount below the picture of 
the head. If the coin lands on a tail, you will win the amount below the picture of tail of this 
coin….I now offer a chance for you to choose one of the six lotteries displayed in the next image, 
which may allow you to earn from 0 to 200 ETB, depending on your choice of lottery and your 
luck. The total amount of reward you will get will depend on the outcome of the lottery you 
choose, which will depend on the outcome of the coin that I’m going to flip. (ILRI 2014) 
  
The respondent is then shown a series of six images of head and tail sides of an Ethiopian coin and 
associated amounts of money and is asked to choose. The six gambles are displayed in Table A3. Using 
these data, we created a set of binary variables by combining the two highest, middle and lowest choice 
numbers to represent low, moderate and high risk aversion, respectively. 
 
Table A3:  Risk Preference Experiment Choices  
Choice Number Heads Amount (ETB) Tails Amount (ETB) Risk Aversion Classification 
0 50 50 High 
1 45 95 High 
2 40 120 Medium 
3 30 150 Medium 
4 10 190 Low 
5 0 200 Low 
  
 
IBLI Information Sources 
 Information was collected at P4 on whether individuals heard about IBLI through specific 
information sources. These sources are:  neighbors, friends and relatives in informal groups; development 
agents or other government officials; community meetings; the survey conducted by ILRI; discount 
coupons; cartoons; poet tapes; radio; television; posters; Oromia Insurance Company (OIC) staff and/or 
Oromia Savings and Credit Share Company; NGO staff; network groups; other. Given confusion about 
this question that was noticed during the qualitative phase of research, this variable was structured the 
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percentage of total information sources that were home-centered, that is, information sources that 
potentially educate about IBLI that are accessible from home. This percentage is expressed as whole 
numbers between 0 and 100 to aid in interpretation. The number of information sources at P3 and P5 are 
assumed to be the same as at P4 and P6.  
 
IBLI Knowledge 
 The IBLI knowledge variable is constructed using a count of correct answers to the following 
eight questions: 
 Based on your understanding of the livestock insurance, how often do you have to pay a premium 
in order to remain insured? 
 If you did not receive indemnity payout (compensation) from the livestock insurance, would you 
expect to receive your premium back? 
 When you receive an indemnity payment (compensation) in what form do you expect to receive it 
in? 
 Based on your understanding of the livestock insurance, under what conditions do you expect 
indemnity payout (compensation)? 
 Suppose that you had insured 10,000 Birr of cows. What is the maximum indemnity payment that 
you can receive after a worse drought? 
 What institution will provide you indemnity payout in October 2013 if there is a payout? 
 Boru insured 10 cattle by IBLI. There was no drought but Boru lost 8 cattle due to disease 
outbreak. Will Boru receive indemnity payout? 
 Godana has decided to purchase IBLI for 1 cattle, 1 camel and 1 shoat among his herds. Will 
Godana pay different amount of premium for all the three species of animals? 
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These questions are asked only at P4 and P6, so values for P3 and P5 are assumed equal to P4 and P6 
values. 
 
Lactating Herd 
 The number and species of lactating animals is collected as part of the survey. However, the 
survey doesn’t capture herd dynamics (birth, death, offtake, slaughter) by animal sex, so we cannot 
compute lactating animals for P1, P3 and P5 directly. Therefore these values are assumed to be the same 
as P2, P4 and P6 respectively. Lactating animals are aggregated using TLU in order to at least partially 
capture the differences in milk production volume between species. However, TLU conversions are not 
designed specifically for lactating animals, which may have profoundly different metabolic processes.  
 
Horrii Siiqqee Animals 
 Horrii siiqqee (HS) animals are cattle that are transferred to a newly married couple from the 
bride’s household. Current HS stocks were collected at P6, along with information on birth, death, offtake 
and slaughter of HS animals in the preceding year. Flows information was used to back out HS values for 
P4 and P5. Additionally, HS stocks at the time of marriage were collected for all ever-married 
households. All HS values are converted to percentage of total cattle herd.  
 
Effective Price 
 The effective price of IBLI is designed to capture as accurately as possible the actual price faced 
by the individual consumer. The price of IBLI varies by species, geographic location (woreda) and 
discount coupon amount. Coupons offer a percentage discount on IBLI purchase up to the first 15 TLU of 
livestock purchased. However, IBLI is priced by species and not by TLU and effective price must be in 
price per TLU in order to allow for aggregated analysis across species. One approach is to use the actual 
prices paid by those who purchased IBLI on various combinations of animal species, but we would still 
have to transform those prices into a price per TLU and would still have no straightforward way of 
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defining a price for non-purchasers. We chose to calculate the effective TLU price as the price per animal 
for the first 15 cattle using the woreda-level IBLI cattle prices minus any discount coupon received by the 
household. Woreda-level IBLI prices remain relatively constant throughout the survey periods, while 
coupons are distributed in advance of each sales period. This allows for calculation of effective price for 
all panel periods.  
 
Share of Income from Livestock 
 The share of income from livestock is defined as income from milk, offtake and slaughter divided 
by total income and is calculated for all panel periods. It is expressed as a number from 0-100 to aid in 
interpretation of results. 
 
Losses in Previous Period 
 Previous period losses are the lagged values of livestock mortality as reported by respondents. 
Because this information is reported seasonally, no assumptions were needed to complete the panel.  
 
Expected Rangeland Conditions 
 Respondents are asked about their expectation for the coming (long) rainy season and rangeland 
condition. Their responses are scaled so that 1=much below normal, 3=normal and 5=much above 
normal. We then created a set of dummy variables representing above normal, normal and below normal, 
with normal as the omitted category in regressions. Expected conditions for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed 
equal to P2, P4 and P6. 
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APPENDIX B:  Attrition Analysis 
 
 Ten per cent of the original survey sample attritted over the three survey rounds. We used two 
approaches to testing for systematic attrition—simple means tests on key observables and a logistic 
regression using a binary variable representing whether a household was retained in the panel or lost to 
attrition. Means tests using the main sample used for purchase decision regressions suggest that multiple 
variables are different between panel and non-panel households, as reported in column (1) of Table 1B. 
However, means differences disappear when multivariate methods are used. So in column (2) we report 
the logit estimates of the binary variable that the household attritted. The logit model demonstrates that 
attrition is not systematic once we condition on key variables. Similar to the main sample, univariate 
means tests, reported in column (3) show significant differences. The logit of attrition within the 
bargaining subsample of two decision maker households, reported in column (4), shows gender and 
wealth related attrition patterns, which are not surprising given that households with two married adults 
have different dependency ratios and productive capacity than single-adult households. Marital status is 
also a significant predictor of attrition, which makes sense since being married and having two decision 
makers in the household are highly correlated. Overall, attrition does not appear to be of concern to the 
main estimation results, and bargaining results need to be interpreted with attrition patterns in mind. 
 
  
55  
 
Table 1B:  Attrition Analysis 
      Main Sample Bargaining Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female-headed household 0.152 -0.00520 0.660*** -0.0488 
 
(1.97) (0.00607) (15.52) (0.0522) 
Married=1/Nonmarried=0 0.022 -0.00935 -0.635*** 0.432*** 
 
(0.39) (0.0102) (-14.49) (0.118) 
Moderate risk aversion -0.005 -0.00361 -0.019 -0.0557* 
 
(-0.06) (0.00401) (-0.37) (0.0327) 
High risk aversion -0.054 0.0180 -0.008 0.0369 
 
(-1.25) (0.0136) (-0.23) (0.0602) 
ln Total Transfers -2.420*** 0.00525 -1.215*** 0.0988*** 
 
(-5.89) (0.00530) (-6.74) (0.0273) 
Financial literacy -0.272 0.000430 -0.622*** 0.0308** 
 
(-1.26) (0.000921) (-4.25) (0.0138) 
Head Education -0.062 0.00143 -0.346* 0.0191 
 
(-0.21) (0.00208) (-2.27) (0.0171) 
Dependency ratio 0.101 0.000914 0.453*** 0.00516 
 
(0.53) (0.00130) (3.63) (0.0147) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.009 0.00349 0.058 0.0511 
 
(-0.18) (0.00513) (1.65) (0.0602) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.027 0.00370 -0.041 0.0539 
 
(0.41) (0.00458) (-0.90) (0.0414) 
Age of household head -4.898 0.000004 2.350 0.000782 
 
(-1.68) 0.0000574 (1.21) (0.000915) 
Asset Index -0.100 0.000385 -0.525*** 0.00979 
 
(-0.75) (0.00119) (-5.75) (0.0188) 
ln Income -0.971*** -0.000181 -0.755*** -0.00405 
 
(-6.16) (0.00194) (-8.92) (0.0363) 
ln Herd Size -0.822*** -0.00504 -0.871*** -0.0820** 
 
(-4.16) (0.00554) (-8.62) (0.0341) 
ln Savings -0.362 0.000217 -0.963*** 0.00770 
 
(-0.91) (0.000421) (-3.89) (0.00594) 
Observations 514 512 514 512 
T-statistics and standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX C:  Description of Qualitative Study 
 
Introduction 
 Mixed methodological and interdisciplinary approaches have been common in many disciplines, 
including development economics, since the 1980s. The 2001 “Q-squared” workshop and associated 
compilation of works (Kanbur 2002) highlighted the use of multiple research methodologies as a 
corollary to the broader interest in interdisciplinary social science research. Within development 
economics, qualitative methodologies are increasingly used to tackle questions of identification of the 
poor and causal explanations of poverty (see Shaffer 2013 for review). Qualitative approaches have 
contributed to these analyses in a variety of ways, such as determining locally meaningful definitions and 
weights for dimensions of poverty, which are then incorporated into formal modeling, as well as 
enriching understanding of the overall causal framework underlying poverty dynamics.xvi Few, if any, 
mixed methods studies in development economics explicitly describe the qualitative methods used to the 
extent that is demanded in quantitative studies. Quantitative methodological procedures are made explicit, 
but qualitative are not, which undermines the credibility of inferences drawn using qualitative data (see 
Constas 1992).  
 Methodologically, this study aims to take the Q-squared work a step further by making explicit 
the purposes of qualitative approaches for the questions of interest and the procedures used. The 
credibility of any empirical finding hinges upon adherence to standards of validity and reliability in data 
collection tools, and the nature of the inference one intends to make from data is associated with a 
necessary level of rigor in these areas (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). With this in mind, this study 
applies lessons learned from Q-squared in order to understand the determinants of demand for Index-
Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) that vary by gender in the Borana Zone of southern Ethiopia. Within 
this, some sub-questions lend themselves easily to quantitative approaches, while others benefit from a 
complementary qualitative approach. Questions focused on the magnitude and direction of relationships, 
and the relative influence of variables on IBLI purchase behaviors are well served by quantitative 
approaches. Questions focused on individual perceptions, reasoning processes, and context-dependent 
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explanations associated with the decision to purchase IBLI are well served by qualitative approaches. 
From a modeling perspective, qualitative methods can improve modeling precision by exploring the 
structure of measurement error in existing quantitative data and identify omitted variables. Key 
quantitative research questions and their qualitative extensions (italics) include:   
 
1. What is the relationship between gender and the IBLI purchase decision? 
a. How and why does household decision-making differ by gender and marital status of 
household head? 
2. Does the relationship between risk aversion and demand for IBLI vary by gender? If so, how? 
a. What are men and women’s perceptions of risks associated with IBLI purchase? 
3. What is the relationship between informal insurance and demand for IBLI? 
a. What insurance strategies, if any, are represented by informal transfers and network 
group participation? 
b. Outside of transfers and network group participation, what forms does informal 
insurance take in Borana? 
4. Does the relationship between informal insurance and IBLI vary between men and women? 
a. Do women experience informal insurance differently than men in terms of access and 
coverage? 
b. Among women, how and why do/don’t informal insurance experiences and coverage 
differ? 
5. What is the relationship between IBLI information channels and IBLI uptake by gender? 
a. What are women and men’s preferred marketing channels and what reasons are given 
for such preferences?  
 
 For each of these five sets of questions, qualitative approaches bring more detailed descriptive 
content to existing quantitative data, which extends our understanding in three specific ways. The first of 
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these, is aiding in model specification. Qualitative data will provide an opportunity to validate 
assumptions made during construction of key variables in the econometric model so that they more 
accurately reflect determinants of IBLI demand. This is particularly relevant given the unique and rapidly 
changing cultural and economic practices of southern Ethiopian pastoralists in the 21st century.  
Second, qualitative data may reveal heterogeneity within categories that appear homogeneous in 
quantitative data. Difficult-to-capture drivers of behavior such as social status may vary dramatically 
among the seemingly homogeneous categories such as “women,” or “men,” and qualitative exploration of 
these categories may explain contradictory or inconclusive findings. Finally, insights gained from 
qualitative data will be used to strengthen the interpretation of econometric findings in order to explain 
outliers, inconsistent findings and provide descriptive support. The ways which each of these purposes 
supports deeper understanding of the above research questions are described in detail in the following 
section.  
 
Gender and the IBLI purchase decision 
 This line of inquiry is designed to investigate intra-household decision-making related to IBLI 
purchase. The quantitative strategy uses household level data with the gender of the household head as a 
proxy for the gender of IBLI purchaser. This approach may limit understanding of intra-household 
dynamics that affect the decision to purchase IBLI. The quantitative strategy accounts for some degree of 
bargaining in two-adult households, but is unable to shed light on decision-making in single-adult 
households. Single adult households in the sample are all female-headed, but autonomy and social status 
will affect the decision-making power of these individuals and likely varies by marital status (McPeak et 
al. 2011). Qualitative interviews will focus on who in the household initiated decision-making related to 
IBLI, the involvement and influence of different household members, and how this decision-making 
process compares to other household decisions. These data will be used to unpack heterogeneity of 
decision-making processes, with particular emphasis on single-adult households. Qualitative data on two-
adult households will aid in the interpretation of bargaining-related quantitative findings.  
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Risk aversion, gender and IBLI demand 
 Perceptions of the IBLI product are clearly linked to the decision to purchase. Theory suggests 
that a risk averse individual will have a higher willingness-to-pay for insurance, however, the relationship 
between risk aversion and index-based insurance products does not convincingly follow this pattern (Giné 
et al. 2008, Cole et al. 2012). If purchasing the insurance product is perceived as risky in itself, then the 
individual’s ambiguity aversion becomes an important factor if he or she prefers the known risk of, say, 
drought to the relatively unknown risk of drought insurance. Ambiguity aversion has been cited as a 
reason for poor uptake of index-based products and has been incorporated into some studies of demand 
(Clarke and Dercon 2009, Clarke 2011). Elabed et al. (2013) link ambiguity aversion to compound risk 
aversion in an experimental setting involving index insurance decisions, finding that compound risk 
aversion may play a role in limited demand for index insurance products. The quantitative strategy for 
understanding risk aversion and IBLI demand does not allow for ambiguity aversion as a determinant of 
demand. Those who are risk-averse but opt not to purchase IBLI may be doing so because they perceive 
IBLI purchase to be an unknown risk relative to drought. In a review of four field studies of index 
insurance marketing, Patt et al. (2009) identify three sources of perceived risk by consumers as (a) lack of 
trust in the implementers of the insurance product, (b) lack of trust in the index and (c) lack of trust in 
one’s own understanding of the product and associated ability to make the best decision. Qualitative 
interviews will focus on trust in these aspects of IBLI and, using Patt’s framework, the data will allow for 
better understanding of the potential role of ambiguity aversion. Of particular interest is whether there is a 
difference in trust in the IBLI product between men and women, which will contribute to interpretation of 
econometric results relating to risk aversion.  
 
Informal insurance and IBLI demand 
 The relationship between informal insurance strategies and formal insurance products is key to 
understanding demand for IBLI. The quantitative strategy for understanding this relationship uses data on 
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cash and in-kind transfers and network group membership to represent access to and coverage by 
informal insurance. Limitations of the use of observed transfers or network groups are multifold. First, 
transfers and network groups are institutions that have the potential to provide insurance, but the extent to 
which they do so is unknown and therefore these may be poor measures of informal insurance. Second, 
they do not represent the complete set of transfers or network activities available to the respondent; they 
represent only those the respondent chose to activate in the reporting period. Finally, informal insurance 
behaviors are driven by unobserved characteristics that are likely to simultaneously influence IBLI 
demand. These challenges are very difficult to overcome analytically using qualitative or quantitative 
methods alone. Mixed methods using the best techniques from each side may be especially useful. 
Interviews will attempt to understand the extent to which reported transfers and groups represent 
insurance by eliciting detailed information on the circumstances surrounding actual transfers received and 
given as well as network group participation reported in the household survey. Of particular interest are 
the circumstances and expectations surrounding the transfer and, for transfers given, the consequences of 
not agreeing to give the transfer. For transfers received, we will attempt to elicit information on 
hypothetical alternative sources of transfers and/or recourse available to the recipient had the giver 
refused to give. Qualitative data will serve to validate existing survey data by uncovering heterogeneity in 
the functions of transfers and group membership. This may inform the specification or interpretation of 
the econometric model. Qualitative data will also provide description of other informal insurance 
strategies outside of transfers and network groups that may not have been captured in the survey data. 
 
Informal insurance, gender and IBLI demand 
 Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that there exist notable differences in access to and 
coverage by informal insurance along dimensions of wealth and social-connectedness (Santos and Barrett 
2011, Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett 2009). Gender differences in wealth and social-connectedness are 
visible in existing IBLI household data from the study region, suggesting the existence of gender 
differences in informal insurance access and coverage. Within female-headed households, one sees 
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variation in wealth and social connectedness by marital status, suggesting further heterogeneity within the 
female informal insurance experience. Interviews will focus on perceptions and perceived drivers of 
relative access to and coverage by informal insurance by gender and marital status. Qualitative data will 
aid in understanding heterogeneity among female-headed households and support interpretation of 
findings related to the interaction of gender and informal insurance on IBLI demand. 
 
Gender and IBLI information channels 
 Index insurance products are often unfamiliar to their targeted consumers and, given the low 
levels of education in Borana, education about the product is a major component of product marketing. 
Gender sensitivity in marketing and education is relevant where gender roles potentially result in different 
access to information channels and intensities. The extent to which this is the case in the study population 
is unknown. Quantitative data used for understanding how information channels interact with gender are 
limited to the nature of marketing channels, but do not capture the intensity of exposure to information 
from each channel or the individual’s relative difficulty or ease of accessing each channel. Interviews will 
reference reported sources of information about IBLI and elicit individual’s experiences and preferences 
relating information channels. These data will contribute to basic understanding of information channel 
preferences by gender, as well as elicit richer description of households’ information experience in terms 
of access and intensity. Information channel preferences will provide the basis for econometric 
specification of the information channel variable used in testing gender differences. 
 
 
Qualitative Methodological Procedures 
Sampling 
 The qualitative sample will be a sub-sample of the survey households. We sampled for 
heterogeneity along pertinent characteristics of the full household survey sample as diagrammed in Figure 
1 below. Heterogeneous sampling generates detailed descriptions of unique categories as well as 
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crosscutting patterns that derive their significance from having emerged out of heterogeneity (Patton 
2002). Categories of interest in this study are IBLI purchase, gender of household head and marital status. 
IBLI purchase and gender of household head are the top characteristics of interest, therefore the full 
survey sample is divided into subgroups of those who purchased and those who did not and further 
subdivided by the gender of the household head. Adding marital status as a third sampling dimension 
allows us to better understand commonalities and differences among women based on the rationale that 
female-headed households may differ markedly depending on whether the female head is married, 
widowed or divorced. There is no variation in marital status of male-headed households, as men appear to 
remarry quickly after losing a spouse. Finally, given that wealth is associated, both empirically and in the 
survey data, with gender, informal insurance and marital status, we consider wealth when selecting my 
sample. 
 The sampling scheme is depicted in Figure 1C. Distributions are stylized representations of 
relative distributions from the R2 data.xvii  we sample eight individuals at the median wealth level in each 
cell, as illustrated by the solid stars.xviii As a measure of wealth, we used the household’s herd size 
because of the centrality of livestock to Boran livelihoods. Given its importance, extra care and diligence 
is taken by enumerators when collecting herd size data and therefore they are hopefully measured with 
less error. Because wealth is a likely driver of many phenomena of interest in this study and wealth levels 
are significantly different in existing survey data between male and female household heads of different 
marital statuses, we have chosen to interview six additional women with wealth levels that correspond to 
the median wealth of the male interviewee of the same purchase category, as depicted by the blue lines 
and six transparent stars. Comparison of responses between men and women of the same wealth level 
may be suggestive of the extent to which wealth is a driver of the phenomena of interest. 
 Time and resources necessarily limit the sample size. The choice to oversample women is 
justified by existing evidence in the survey data that there is notable heterogeneity in female-headed 
households within the study population. Better understanding how this heterogeneity influences insurance 
access by women is a necessary step toward understanding whether IBLI is a gender-neutral intervention. 
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Although generalization is obviously not possible with such a limited sample size, the qualitative findings 
derived from this study will provide an inductively grounded set of propositions that can direct future 
analysis in the present study and help formulate questions for future studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The sampling scheme was confounded by measurement error in the IBLI purchase and marital 
status variables. After attempting to correct for and replace households with mis-measured key 
characteristics, the structure of the sample changed from what is depicted in Figure 1C to that depicted in 
Figure 2C. Additional time for interviews also allowed for two extra males to be sampled that had been 
excluded previously due to anticipated time constraints.  
 
 
 
64  
 
 
 
Interview Procedure 
 The final interview guide is included below. There are several key features of the interview guide. 
First, a standardized set of probes inspired by Patton (2002) was developed for eliciting complete 
responses. Four types of probes were intended encourage the elaboration, clarification, justification and 
illustration of responses. These probes were intended to be used consistently throughout the interview to 
minimize bias induced by spontaneous phrasing of probes, however these efforts were thwarted by 
challenges involving interpretation in the actual implementation and standardized probes were rarely 
used. Other questions were designed to be initially open-ended, with pre-defined prompts associated with 
key concepts from previous empirical work. Prompts were used as needed when open-ended questions 
and probes failed to touch upon key topics. In order to connect the quantitative and qualitative data in a 
way that allows for meaningful inference, some interview questions were structured around quantitative 
data points for the household in question. For example, we used respondents’ R3 data on transfers given, 
transfers received and network group participation to structure the informal insurance section of the 
interview around discussions of specific transfers and groups the household was involved in. Discussions 
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of information channels drew on data reported by the household on the sources of IBLI information that 
they reported in R3. This guide was refined in the field through pre-testing (out-of-sample) prior to the 
interviews. 
 Interviews were conducted over three weeks following collection of the R3 household survey 
data. Interviews were held in or near the respondents’ homes, with the exception of three interviews that 
were held in a neighboring village due to inaccessibility of the respondents’ home villages. Interviews 
were conducted using an experienced interpreter who underwent three days of training specific to the 
interview guide. Training included discussion of key terms and their interpretations in Oromiffaa, careful 
translation of questions, probes and prompts, and field-testing of interview guide. Oral consent was 
obtained using the IRB-approved consent script included below. The interview took between 2 and 4 
hours and the respondents were compensated with ETB 100 for their time.  
   
Analysis procedure 
 Transcription and analysis of interview data took place in the weeks following the interviews. 
Analysis took both deductive and inductive forms based on previous empirical findings, theory, and 
observed limits of theory. A pre-determined analytical framework for each theme (noted in the second 
column of tables in interview guide) was developed based on previous empirical findings. Where there 
was little or no previous work around which to structure a framework, a more inductive strategy was 
taken with the objective of exploring the range of responses.  
 Deductive analysis began with a coding process associated with each pre-determined analytical 
bins. We also analyzed residual responses that did not conform to the analytical bins in a more inductive 
manner. The second stage of analysis was to involve comparisons of response dominance between men 
and women (Sections A-E of interview guide), purchasers and non-purchasers (Section B), lower and 
higher wealth households (Sections C and D) and among women of different marital statuses (Section D). 
Dominant responses are defined using a frequency threshold or those with low frequency but a direct 
relationship to theory or previous empirical findings. We define “strong dominance” as a response 
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frequency of over 66% in any given category, weak dominance as less than 33% in a given category and 
moderate dominance as the interval in between. Some weak responses were meaningful and worthy of 
analytical attention, despite their infrequency, due to their alignment with theory and/or previous 
empirical findings.  
 Inductive analysis involved looking for response dominance and relational patterns within 
responses where there was weak or no empirical precedent for analysis and/or where individual 
experiences diverge from the analytical bins. Divergences and commonalities across responses were 
recorded, as well as comparisons between key groups discussed above.  
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APPENDIX D:  Additional Results 
 
Table D1: IBLI Purchase Decision--Reported (AME) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    Female headed household -0.115 0.002 0.251 
 
(0.178) (0.217) (0.353) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 
  
-0.025 
   
(0.144) 
HS at marriage 
  
0.027 
   
(0.032) 
Female Head X Home info 
 
0.001 0.002 
  
(0.001) (0.002) 
Home-centered information 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Female Head X Transfers 
 
0.003 -0.022 
  
(0.015) (0.032) 
ln Transfers 
 
-0.007 -0.004 
  
(0.008) (0.008) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion 
 
0.033 0.010 
  
(0.050) (0.099) 
Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.021 -0.025 
  
(0.024) (0.024) 
Female Head X High risk aversion 
 
-0.127 -0.079 
  
(0.080) (0.254) 
High risk aversion 
 
-0.513 -0.517 
  
(1.147) (1.171) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.023 -0.022* -0.019 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
Lagged IBLI purchase 
 
-0.100*** -0.110*** 
  
(0.026) (0.030) 
Assigned coupon 0.123*** 0.118*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.033) 
    Household Average Characteristic HAC1 HAC2 HAC2 
    Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
LR Chi2 117.49 585.92 487.83 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following coefficients are non-significant and not 
reported:  IBLI knowledge, education, previous period losses dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions, age, age-
squared, non-livestock assets, (ln)income, savings, proportion of income from livestock and (ln)herd. HAC2 contains head age 
and age-squared, non-livestock assets, income, proportion of income from livestock, cash savings, previous period purchase, 
effective price, IBLI knowledge and all HAC1. 
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Table D2: Level of IBLI Purchase--Reported 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    Female headed household 0.198 0.257 0.221 
 
(0.526) (0.744) (1.219) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 
  
1.107** 
   
(0.457) 
HS at marriage 
  
-0.071 
   
(0.093) 
Female Head X Home info 
 
0.0001 0.002 
  
(0.004) (0.008) 
Home-centered information 
 
-0.0002 0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
Female Head X Transfers 
 
0.020 0.008 
  
(0.043) (0.094) 
ln Transfers 
 
-0.011 -0.014 
  
(0.024) (0.027) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.197 -0.293 
  
(0.149) (0.285) 
Moderate risk aversion 
 
0.030 0.028 
  
(0.072) (0.076) 
Female Head X High risk aversion 
 
0.025 -1.764** 
  
(0.253) (0.842) 
High risk aversion 
 
-0.443 0.443 
  
(2.953) (3.147) 
Financial literacy 
 
0.029 0.057* 
  
(0.026) (0.031) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.087** 
 
(0.047) (0.037) (0.039) 
ln Previous period losses (TLU) 0.101* -0.063 0.022 
 
(0.060) (0.065) (0.075) 
Savings > 5 TLU 
 
-0.360*** -0.371*** 
  
(0.129) (0.140) 
lambda 0.441 0.285 -0.226 
 
(0.318) (0.203) (0.204) 
Constant 2.925*** 2.797*** 3.388*** 
 
(0.324) (0.765) (0.768) 
    Household Average Controls HAC1 HAC2 HAC2 
    Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
Chi2 187.8 354.4 250.4 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following coefficients are non-significant and not 
reported:  IBLI knowledge, education, previous period purchase, dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions, age, 
age-squared, non-livestock assets, (ln)income, proportion of income from livestock and (ln)herd. HAC2 contains head 
age and age-squared, non-livestock assets, income, proportion of income from livestock, cash savings, previous period 
purchase, effective price, IBLI knowledge and all HAC1. 
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Table D3: IBLI Purchase Decision--OIC Records=Reported Purchase (AME) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    Female headed household -0.066 0.190 0.307 
 
(0.191) (0.119) (0.193) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 
  
-0.072 
   
(0.065) 
HS at marriage 
  
0.020 
   
(0.014) 
Female Head X Home info 
 
-0.00005 0.0004 
  
(0.0005) (0.001) 
Home-centered information 
 
0.0001 0.0003 
  
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Female Head X Transfers 
 
-0.001 -0.024 
  
(0.006) (0.018) 
ln Transfers 
 
-0.001 0.0002 
  
(0.004) (0.004) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.012 -0.054 
  
(0.021) (0.041) 
Moderate risk aversion 
 
0.007 0.008 
  
(0.011) (0.011) 
Female Head X High risk aversion 
 
-0.066* -0.062 
  
(0.038) (0.120) 
High risk aversion 
 
-0.109 -0.175 
  
(0.474) (0.470) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.108*** -0.050*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.013) 
Lagged IBLI purchase 
 
-0.130*** -0.122*** 
  
(0.023) (0.025) 
Dependency ratio 0.002 -0.013 -0.035** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.017) 
ln Previous period losses (TLU) -0.022 -0.023** -0.028** 
 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.011) 
Assigned coupon 0.083*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.032) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age of household head 
 
-0.046*** -0.041** 
  
(0.015) (0.018) 
Age squared 
 
0.0003** 0.0003** 
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Proportion of income from livestock 
 
-0.0005** -0.0004* 
  
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Savings > 5 TLU 
 
0.040* 0.042* 
  
(0.022) (0.023) 
    Household Average Controls  HAC1 HAC2 HAC2 
    Observations 1,581 1,581 1,305 
LR Chi2 217.84 739.32 638.63 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following coefficients are non-significant and not reported:  
IBLI knowledge, financial literacy, education, dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions, non-livestock assets, income and 
(ln)herd. HAC1 includes dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions and effective price. HAC2 contains head age and age-
squared, non-livestock assets, income, proportion of income from livestock, cash savings, previous period purchase, effective 
price, IBLI knowledge and all HAC1. 
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Table D4:  Level of IBLI Purchase--OIC Records = Reported Purchase 
   (1) (2) (3) 
    Female headed household 0.796 7.893*** 10.021*** 
 
(0.644) (2.108) (2.747) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 
  
0.776* 
   
(0.425) 
HS at marriage 
  
-0.045 
   
(0.073) 
Female Head X Home info 
 
-0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.003) (0.008) 
Home-centered information 
 
0.001 0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers 
 
-0.047 -0.097 
  
(0.040) (0.094) 
ln Transfers 
 
0.023 0.016 
  
(0.023) (0.025) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion 
 
-0.169 -0.142 
  
(0.141) (0.268) 
Moderate risk aversion 
 
0.006 -0.021 
  
(0.066) (0.068) 
Female Head X High risk aversion 
 
0.235 -1.095 
  
(0.238) (0.892) 
High risk aversion 
 
0.565 1.964 
  
(2.889) (2.934) 
IBLI knowledge 
 
0.064** 0.075** 
  
(0.027) (0.030) 
Head Education 
 
-0.053*** -0.060*** 
  
(0.019) (0.019) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.486*** -0.338*** -0.343*** 
 
(0.081) (0.038) (0.038) 
Age of household head 
 
-0.438*** -0.477*** 
  
(0.138) (0.147) 
Age squared 
 
0.003*** 0.003*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
lambda 0.480** -0.046 -0.069 
 
(0.223) (0.088) (0.082) 
Constant 2.905*** 3.173*** 3.468*** 
 
(0.262) (0.596) (0.644) 
    Household Average Characteristics HAC1 HAC2 HAC2 
    Observations 1,581 1,581 1,305 
Chi2 245.2 656.6 620.9 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following coefficients are non-significant 
and not reported:  Savings, non-livestock assets, income, herd size, (ln)income, proportion of income from 
livestock, financial literacy, expected rangeland conditions, previous period purchase and previous perid losses. 
HAC1 includes dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions and effective price. HAC2 contains head age 
and age-squared, non-livestock assets, income, proportion of income from livestock, cash savings, previous 
period purchase, effective price, IBLI knowledge and all HAC1. 
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Table D5:  Intrahousehold Bargaining in Two-Decision-Maker Households 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Sugar Tobacco Drinks Cooking fuel School Soap 
              
Female: (ln) Lactating herd 1,792 187.2** 252.9 303.3* -31.37 -140.3* 
 
(1,471) (76.46) (165.8) (131.7) (36.88) (59.82) 
Male: (ln) Non-lactating herd -902.8 -180.6 -177.6 -320.0 3.459 9.538 
 
(1,378) (131.1) (95.82) (200.0) (26.33) (58.65) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       Observations 1,024 1,024 1,024 1,024 1,024 1,024 
R-squared 0.010 0.017 0.020 0.094 0.014 0.023 
F-statistic 8.830 5.610 3.104 4.313 0.527 2.343 
Prob (Female=Male) 0.0208** 0.0497** 0.121 0.0764* 0.491 0.170 
rho 0.496 0.457 0.548 0.883 0.406 0.333 
              
Horri Siiqqee (% at marriage) -546.9 -211.2 -101.2 6.773 -42.31** -67.96 
 
(1,564) (265.1) (135.2) (222.2) (14.22) (41.95) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household FE N N N N N N 
       Observations 996 996 996 996 996 996 
R-squared 0.009 0.011 0.063 0.035 0.090 0.068 
              
(ln) Female cash income -164.6 -11.64 1.694 -36.51 -0.829 16.05** 
 
(181.5) (10.63) (15.04) (25.71) (5.908) (5.191) 
(ln) Male cash income 273.9 29.77 2.317 -39.65 -1.477 32.48** 
 
(197.4) (26.59) (48.94) (40.08) (10.07) (13.51) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       Observations 955 955 955 955 955 955 
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.016 0.093 0.006 0.026 
F-statistic 1.637 2.458 0.000226 0.00711 0.00622 1.370 
Prob (Female=Male) 0.241 0.161 0.988 0.935 0.939 0.280 
rho 0.429 0.420 0.448 0.897 0.450 0.458 
Controls include household assets, savings, transfers received and household demographic characteristics. Robust 
standard errors clustered at woreda level. Sub-sample excludes households with 1 or >2 decision-makers. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
                                                        
xvi See Krishna’s (2009) Stages of Progress methodology, Parker and Kozel (2007), Sharp (2007), Adato et al. 
(2007) for examples.  
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xvii The number of individuals (n) in each cell of Figure 1C was determined using the R2 survey data. In Figure 2C, n 
has been updated using R3 survey data. 
xviii Median-based sampling is chosen due to the positively skewed nature of wealth distributions and outliers in the 
right tails.  
